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THE *DONGA ILBO* ADVERTISING COERCION AND FORCED LAYOFF CASE

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This paper looks at the Donga Ilbo Advertising Coercion and Forced Layoff Case in South Korea during the years 1974-1975, focusing on the confluence of three institutions: the press, the state, and commercial forces. A look into history finds that the state, dissatisfied with the Donga Ilbo's reporting, leveraged market forces to force it into compliance with its view of proper reporting. This represented a watershed moment in the history of press-state relations in South Korea. The highly contentious state-press relationship, observed at the time of the layoff, can still be seen today. To explore the relationship between the press, the state, and commercial forces, this paper does the following: First, theories of media are introduced to provide a basis for analysis. Second, a brief history of the Korean press leading up to the Donga Ilbo case is covered followed by a detailed overview of the layoff case itself. Lastly, the paper concludes by commenting on the implications of a contentious state-press relationship and current government-media relations in South Korea.

Introduction

The end of the twentieth century witnessed fundamental changes in the world's political and economic structures, combined with technological revolution. South Korea too, faced an unprecedented transition towards democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This change has resulted in liberalization and deregulation in many spheres. The media industry is an important sphere that has been loosened from the grip of the state. The press has become freer since this time and has gained increasing independence. However, the truth is, the press will always be under the influence of power coalitions, mainly those of the state and the market. This can be distinctly observed in the *Donga Ilbo Advertising Coercion and Forced Layoff Case* that occurred during the years of 1974-75 in South Korea. The state took advantage of the relationship between the press and advertisement, and used it as a means to indirectly control information. This

was a rare case in Korean history when the government aimed to regulate press in a roundabout manner. This paper will describe the event in detail and observe the dynamics of power relationships between the government, journalists, managers of newspaper companies and readers in the media. The last section will take a look at state-media relations in South Korea today.

Theories of Media

In her book chapter, *Commercialization, Consumerism and Technology*, Jane Chapman explores the commercialization of media in the twentieth century. Technological breakthroughs along with industrialization, was structured to maximize profit through the exploitation of mass market consumers aided by advertising. Increased urbanization and literacy created a new mass market for the media, pioneered by newspapers. The overall impact of the business development of newspapers had the effect of linking “commerce to ideology,” which was used to legitimize market practices. The rise in the importance of advertising, fostered by the press, created an environment where powerful managers could consolidate their influence with economies of scale and further concentration of ownership. International news agencies were able to produce newspapers in mass scale and volume. Newspapers during this period paved the way for what Kellner has described as one of the main trends of contemporary capitalist societies: “...the synthesis of advertising, culture, information, politics and manipulation.”¹ Since these changes occurred, media has been highly dependent on advertisement for capital in commercialized societies. The press cannot be severed from their commercial feature — their companies that exist in the capitalist system must depend on advertisement to survive.

The press is also influenced by the political structure of a society. Seibert et al. wrote, “the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structure within which it operates and serves as a mirror of the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted.” To observe the relationship between social systems and the press, certain basic beliefs such as “the nature of man, the nature of society and the state, the relation of man to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth,”² must be examined. Seibert also stated that freedom contracts and restraints tighten as the stresses on the stability of the government and the structure of society increas-

1 Jane Chapman, “Commercialization, Consumerism and Technology,” in *Comparative Media History: An Introduction: 1789 to the Present* by Jane Chapman, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005): 71-100.

2 Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), 1-2.

es.³ The history of the Korean media has faced continuous tensions and compromises with political power. Under authoritarian regimes throughout most of the latter twentieth century, media has been functioning under the state's tight grip. Media and those with political power have maintained a close relationship in Korea, and at time have been "collusive," where the media do not perform their role as social critics but form unlawful ties with power.⁴ The Korean press, whose relations with its government have been characterized by "a never ending tug of war," is largely an epitome of Korean society.⁵

The History of Korean Press, 1945-1987

The troubled history of Korean press freedom reflects its socio-political environment. A look at Korean press from the First Republic leading up to the *Donga Ilbo* case will show that press freedom has been chaotic, with more restrictions than protections by laws and policies. During 1945-1948, under the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), Korea was exposed to western traditions of press freedom. Under the introduction of libertarian concepts of press freedom, growth of newspapers of both right and left ideologies arose. As a result of competition, "yellow journalism" was created where newspapers used vivid features and sensationalized news to gain readership and increase circulation. To cope with communist propagandistic and rebellious activities brought on by Korean yellow journalism, the American military personnel announced Ordinance No. 88 in 1946, which required registration and licensing of publication.⁶ The USAMGIK reversed its own stated principles and imposed several authoritarian measures, including censorship of the communist press.⁷

The First Republic was established in 1948 under Rhee Syng-man. His state in the 1950s was fragmented, underdeveloped, and powerless, being seized by political society.⁸ Rhee guaranteed freedom of expression as one of South Korea's basic constitutional rights but supporting it only in theory. The Kwangmu

3 Kyu Ho Youm, "Press Freedom under Constraints: The Case of South Korea," *Asian Survey* 25, no. 8 (1986): 880.

4 Myung-jin Park, Chang-nam Kim, and Byung-woo Sohn. "Modernization, Globalization, and the Powerful State," in *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, ed. James Curran and Myung-jin Park (New York: Routledge, 2000), 111-123.

5 Youm, "Press Freedom under Constraints: The Case of South Korea," 868.

6 Kyu Ho Youm, "South Korea's experiment with a free press." *International Communication Gazette* 53 Sage Publications, (1994): 113.

7 Kyu Ho Youm and Michael B. Salwen, "A Free Press in South Korea: Temporary Phenomenon or Permanent Fixture?" *Asian Survey* 30, no. 3 (1990): 313.

8 Chung-in Moon and Sang-young Rhyu, "'Overdeveloped' State and the Political Economy of Development in the 1950s: A reinterpretation," *Asian Perspective* 23, no. 1 (1999): 198.

Press Code, a repressive decree enacted by the Yi Dynasty in 1907 to deal with newspaper licensing, was still invoked under his regime. During the Korean War, military censorship was imposed on newspapers and even after the armistice of 1953, the regime held a tight grip on the Korean press. As the sociopolitical strains on his presidency increased in the late 1950s, Rhee became more authoritarian in his relationship with the press. He enacted the repressive National Security Act and shut down the production of *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, the leading opposition paper at that time.⁹

Rhee's regime ended during the popular student uprising of April 1960 and was replaced by a parliamentary system under Chang Myon. Under Chang Myon, the old licensing system was replaced with a registration system which caused a chaotic press situation as in 1945-46. It was difficult to tell fact from rumor as there was much confusion about the sources of information. This situation did not last long, however, as the Second Republic was overthrown in a military coup led by General Park Chung-hee in 1961. Park's coup was in part due to his concern with the chaotic press situation during the Chang Myong regime.¹⁰

From 1961 to 1987, Korea was governed by its most repressive regimes. Freedom of the press was more or less restricted under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. In 1961, Decree No. 1 was issued, ordering "prior censorship of all newspapers, magazines feature articles, comics, cartoons, editorials, photographs, and foreign news." In addition, there were approximately twenty different laws issued covering the media.¹¹ Park ruled with an "iron hand," with constitutions and decrees as well as institutions adjusted to suit his needs. Hence he could not be concerned with a free press or an independent judiciary. In a speech before Korean newspapermen in April 1966, Park warned against attacks on the government and urged the press to work with the government in "developing a constructive attitude with which to meet the demands of the new age and the new situation."¹²

In addition to suppression, a collusive relationship between the state and press began to form under Park in the early 1960s. Unlike the previous regime of Rhee Syng-man which was mainly suppressive, the governments of Park and

9 You and Salwen, "A Free Press in South Korea: Temporary Phenomenon or Permanent Fixture?" 313.

10 Youm, "South Korea's experiment with a free press," 113.

11 Eun Suk Sa, "Development of Press Freedom in South Korea since Japanese Colonial Rule," *Asian Culture and History* no. 2 (2009): 8.

12 You and Salwen, "A Free Press in South Korea: Temporary Phenomenon or Permanent Fixture?" 313-314.

Chun adopted the policy of suppression and appeasement.¹³ To accomplish his economic development goals, Park often mobilized the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to conduct extralegal activities, and invoked a series of emergency decrees to muzzle the press. Park's repressive regime reached its climax in 1972 with the 'Yushin' Constitution legitimizing his rule through a false constitutional body that routinely elected and reelected him. Under this system, anyone critical of his presidency was cracked down on through emergency decrees, some even forbidding conversations let alone publishing editorials that suggested the desire of revising the constitution to permit free debate and democracy against his rule.¹⁴

***Donga Ilbo* Advertising Coercion and Forced Layoff Case**

It was within this context that the *Donga Ilbo* Advertising Coercion and Forced Layoff Case took place. There were several catalytic events that led to this event. In April 1971, the state pressured senior editors and supervisors to criticize and threaten journalists who reported student protests or negative coverage on the Presidential elections of 1971. Thus, journalists who participated in demonstrations were singled out in the offices and in the field. An atmosphere of negative reinforcement and favoritism occurred in Korea's media industry. Furthermore, the state increased its ability to repress further by revising the 1963 Media Law in 1973. The initial Media Law gave the government authority to monitor and censor any media publications as well as televised and radio news.¹⁵ The revised Media Law gave the president power to censor before or after the publication of undesirable materials and to have total control over written and televised channels. This revised law gave Park near absolute power over the media. In addition, the government forced mergers of several newspapers to consolidate organizational control over media companies. The aftermath of this revision sparked protest from journalists from various media companies and organizations including *Donga Ilbo* (November 20, 1973), *Han'guk Ilbo* (November 22, 1973), *Chosun Ilbo* (November 27, 1973), *Joongang Ilbo* (November 30, 1973), *Dongyang Pangsong* (November 30, 1973), *Kidokkyo Pangsongguk* (November 12, 1973), *Munhwa Pangsongguk* (November 28, 1973), *Han'guk Sinmun P'yŏnjip Wiwŏnhoe* (December 5, 1973), and others.¹⁶

13 Park, Kim and Sohn, "Modernization, Globalization, and the Powerful State," 112-113.

14 Sunwoo Nam, "The Korean Press After Park," *The International Communication Gazette* 26, no. 4 (1980): 259-260.

15 Gi-wook Shin et al., "South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report," Stanford University, (2007): 40.

16 Shin et al., "South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project

The most crucial response to the revised Media Law and censorship by the government was *Donga Ilbo*'s Declaration of Action for the Freedom of Media (*chayu òllon silch'òn sònǒn*) on October 24, 1974. In the Declaration for Freedom of Media, *Donga Ilbo* journalists vowed to take part in the movement for media freedom and continue reporting on the repression of students and other groups, even if it meant enduring persecution. This statement sparked a series of journalist-instigated protest events in 1975. When the Declaration was put forth, the media had already become a target of public criticism and distrust for failing to fulfill their social responsibilities. Thus, the Declaration was an expression of the frustrations felt by journalists. Soon after, college students, religious groups, writers, and professors followed to support the *Donga Ilbo* journalists.¹⁷ The Declaration was a significant statement for media freedom, and a host of other newspapers and media groups made similar declarations. Over 31 newspapers and media groups in total, including some government sponsored media organizations, actively fought for media freedom following the *Donga Ilbo*'s Declaration.¹⁸

The government intervened not long after. In response, the state coerced advertising companies under contract with *Donga Ilbo* to cancel placement of advertisements in the newspaper and its two sister media firms, the monthly *Shin Donga* and *Donga Broadcasting System* (DBS).¹⁹ On December 24, 1974, the state declared that "no business or corporation or any other group will advertise in the *Donga Ilbo* newspaper," effectively cutting off their main source of funding. This action was met by fierce resistance from various social groups. Other media groups, students, Christians, intellectuals, individuals, and even one military soldier bought advertisement space to maintain publications of *Donga Ilbo*. Most of these advertisement spaces were used to insert words in support for *Donga Ilbo* journalists and the freedom of press. The purchasing of advertisement space gained so much momentum that people stood in long lines outside of the *Donga Ilbo* building in downtown Seoul. Groups that bought such advertisements also organized fund raising events to support *Donga Ilbo*.²⁰ The following statements were written in the advertisement spaces purchased by civilians:

Report," 41.

17 Park Myung-jin, Chang-nam Kim, and Byung-woo Sohn, "Modernization, Globalization, and the Powerful State," 119.

18 Shin et al., 42.

19 Byung-hee Kim, "Gwangowa Eonronjayuui Gwanryonyangsang," ("The Relationship between Advertisement and Freedom of Press.") *Journal of Advertisement Studies* 22, no.1 (2001): 152.

20 Shin et al., 42.

"I live for the joy of reading Dong Ilbo."

– January 11, 1975 Ikmyung Bookstore

"Ways down the road when my son asks me what I did in the year 1975, I will proudly tell him that I stood at the front of the fight for the freedom of press." – Mr. and Mrs. Jo.

"Know that these small advertisements are the people's bullets."

– February 22, 1975 Editor of OOPublishing.

"Politicians, businessmen, and fellow citizens, let's not become a crowd of cowards." – High school Teacher Lee.

"Having our ears and eyes covered is more painful than hunger."

– Hong Eun-dong and Kim Tae-hyun.

"Donga Ilbo, you have lit the torch during half a century of suffering. Please continue shining." – Seong Gi-tak²¹

Readers of *Donga Ilbo* fought for freedom of press against the state and the abusive powers of those in media. The Korean audience did not remain passive receivers of the government's messages, but they were able to read between the lines and understand the social situation despite censorship and distortion of information by the state. This decoding by the readers is parallel to Stuart Hall's theory of encoding and decoding. Hall gives significance to the role of the decoder and emphasizes that what is encoded is not necessarily accepted by the readers. Decoders are likely to comprehend messages different from what the encoder intended when common codes and social positions are not shared. The readership of *Donga Ilbo* represents this oppositional reading. The reader understands the messages but rejects them and brings an alternative frame of reference.²²

The readers of *Donga Ilbo* aided journalists in their struggle against state repression. The purchasing of advertisement spaces enabled the newspaper to continue publishing, but only for a short period of time. Ultimately, this was not enough to maintain production of the newspaper. Furthermore, the state pressured managers to fire journalists who were active in the media freedom or democracy movement.²³ *Donga Ilbo*'s board of directors eventually fell into the submission by the government and on seven occasions, between March and May of 1975, the *Donga Ilbo* fired 49 journalists and "indefinitely suspended"

21 Byung-hee Kim, "Gwangowa Eonronjayuui Gwanryonyangsang," 156.

22 Stuart Hall, "Encoding/Decoding," in *Popular Culture: Production and Consumption*, ed. Lee Harrington and Denise Bieble (Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001), 131.

23 Park, Myung-jin, Kim, Chang-nam and Sohn, Byung-woo. "Modernization, Globalization, and the Powerful State." In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, ed. James Curran and Myung-jin Park (New York: Routledge, 2000), 119.

the employment of 84 others.²⁴ In order to maintain their business, managers of *Donga Ilbo* yielded to the wishes of the government. This portrays the press' dependence on advertisement for source of funding—without advertisements to bring in capital, they were not able to maintain production.

The *Donga Ilbo* is still a topic of concern in today's Korean society. On October 29, 2008, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission formally recommended that the state and *Donga Ilbo* "apologize to those who were fired and make appropriate amends" for what the commission defined as "a case in which the state power apparatus, in the form of the KCIA, engaged in serious civil rights violations."²⁵ The commission reported the KCIA summoned advertising companies to its infamous facility in Seoul's Namsan neighborhood and coerced them into signing written documents pledging to cancel their contracts with *Donga Ilbo* and *Donga Broadcasting*. Furthermore, individuals who bought smaller advertisement spaces for *Donga Ilbo* were either called in or physically detained by the KCIA and threatened with tax audits. The commission cited the *Donga Ilbo* for "surrendering to the unjust demands of the Yusin regime by firing journalists at the government's insistence, instead of protecting the journalists that had stood by the newspaper to defend its honor and press freedom." The commission cited executives at the time for "failing to admit that the firings were forced by the regime" and for thereby "going along with suppression of press freedoms for claiming they were being fired for managerial reasons."²⁶

Transition to a Freer Press

The assassination of Park did not change the political scene much as Chun Doo-hwan continued the suppressive military regime. Thus, press freedom continued to suffer in Korea. The relative freedom that Korean press now has was declared in the June 29, 1987 speech of President Roh Tae Woo, then chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party. He stated:

"[T]o promote the freedom of the press, the relevant systems and practices must be drastically improved. The Basic Press Law, which may have been well meant but has nonetheless been criticized by most journalists should promptly be either extensively revised or abolished and

24 "Donga Ilbo and the government are told to apologize for past civil rights violations," *The Hankyoreh*, October 30, 2008, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/318967.html (accessed May, 2013).

25 Ibid.

26 "Donga Ilbo and the government are told to apologize for past civil rights violations," *The Hankyoreh*, October 30, 2008.

replaced by a different law. Newspapers should again be permitted to station their correspondents in the provinces, the press card system should be abolished and newspapers should be allowed to increase the number of their pages as they see fit. These and other necessary steps must be taken to guarantee the freedom of the press to the maximum. The government cannot control the press nor should it attempt to do so. No restrictions should be imposed on the press except when national security is a risk. It must be remembered that the press can be tried only by an independent judiciary or by individual citizens.”²⁷

Since this declaration, the legal framework on press freedom has become less restrictive. The Basic Press Act of 1980 was repealed in November that year, and replaced with two separate statutes, the Act on Registration of Periodicals and the Broadcast Act. The Act of Registration of Periodicals does not authorize the Ministry of Public Information (MPI) to cancel registration of periodicals but still permits suspension of registration if the publisher filed an application by unlawful means. The Broadcast Act gives power to the president to appoint the members of the Broadcasting Commission, but also gives authority to the Commission over programming and broadcasting policies. Lee Jae-won, a former Korean news reporter and current professor of journalism stated: “Relations between the press and the government have been turbulent and explosive in the modern history of Korea. Relations in the future will depend largely on the margin of safety the government feels toward domestic political stability and perceived external threats to Korea’s security.”²⁸ Thus in practice, laws may vary in degree depending on the ruling style of political leaders, and Korea’s press will continue to be influenced by the political structure. As Youm stated, “a nation’s press system is free, not necessarily because of constitutional guarantee, but because an unintimidated judiciary protects the press against government encroachment.”²⁹

Government-Media Relations Today

Since the democratic transition, press has become “free,” but the government continues to play a crucial role in defining the structure of the media: ownership, content, and relationship with the state. The result is a highly contentious relationship, wherein the government still exercises—or attempts to exercise—

27 Kyu Ho Youm, “South Korea’s experiment with a free press,” *International Communication Gazette* 53, Sage Publications (1994): 114.

28 Youm, “South Korea’s experiment with a free press,” 114-115, 120.

29 Youm, “Press Freedom under Constraints: The Case of South Korea,” 881.

control. The development of “political parallelism” and a rapidly expanding media market after the democratic transition are important factors that explain a contentious government-media relationship.

Political parallelism refers to the degree of ideological alignment between the press and political parties. The level of political parallelism in South Korea is high, a result of Korea’s press structure. In other consolidated democracies, the press plays the role of the “fourth estate,” checking the power and influence of the government and other political institutions. In Korea, the role of the press is fundamentally—that is, structurally—different. In a majoritarian political system with weakly institutionalized parties, the press plays the role of demarcating political and social cleavages, in addition to articulating and advocating public policies. The result is a press that plays a highly politicized role. Thus, progressive dailies champion the progressive cause, while conservative dailies defend conservative policies.³⁰ The structure of the press-party parallel, as it is often called, makes a contentious press-government relationship all the more likely. The Kim Dae-jung tax audit in the early 2000s and the current press-government relationship reveals as much.

President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy was one of the main points of contention between his government and the conservative press. The conservative *Chosun Ilbo*, *Joongang Ilbo* and *Donga Ilbo*, continuously criticized Kim and his Sunshine Policy from the beginning of his presidency.³¹ Kim’s historically contentious relationship with these conservative papers, especially the *Chosun Ilbo*, was an obvious factor in the ardent criticism of the policy, since the newspapers gave it almost no time before they started to criticize his new policy. In response to these widely publicized and consistent criticisms from the conservative press, Kim decided that he was going to fight back, even if he had to use coercive methods against the press that he had once criticized as an opposition leader. In February 2001, the Kim administration launched a tax audit of Seoul-based news media. A National Tax Service (NTS) investigation into inheritance taxes led to massive fines imposed on the big three conservative newspapers, as well as some jail time for certain conservative newspaper executives. The results of the audit revealed that 23 news media organizations and owners concealed between 1995 and 2000 an aggregate income of about \$1 billion and were assessed a total of \$388.9 million in back taxes and penal-

30 June Woong Rhee, Hang Je Cho, Hyun Joo Song and June Hee Jung, “South Korean Media System: Toward a Democratization Model,” *Korean Social Sciences Review* 1, no.1 (2011): 303-337.

31 Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, “Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate Over Policies Toward North Korea,” *RAND Corporation* (2002), 71-74.

ties. The Korean Fair Trade Commission added fines for alleged unfair trading practices of \$18.6 million on 16 of the news media firms. Representing a disproportionate amount of financial burden towards Kim's biggest critics, about \$200 million in penalties were imposed against *Chosun Ilbo*, *Donga Ilbo* and *Joongang Ilbo*. Furthermore, Bang Sang-Hoon, president of the *Chosun Ilbo*, Kim Byung-Kwan, joint owner of *Donga Ilbo* and Cho Hee-Joon, who controls *Kookmin Ilbo*, all executives from critical conservative newspapers, were arrested and jailed.³²

Along with the development of political parallelism, a dynamic media market emerged after the breakdown of the state's grip on the monopolistic media in the late 1980s. This ever-expanding market fostered severe competition between media outlets. Pressure from proprietors, managerial groups and advertisers increased, and journalists submitted to managerial demand while neglecting professional values.³³ The government intervened in the competitive media market as a large advertiser for newspapers as well as a competition regulator. The establishment of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) in February 2008 during the Lee Myung-bak administration demonstrates this intervention. The internal structure of the KCC allows for the possibility that the commission will be dominated by the party in power, influencing the media through an array of channels including licensing and personnel decisions.³⁴ The Lee Myung-bak administration and the KCC were accused of favoring conservative newspaper companies in the licensing of new general-programming cable television channels. Also under the Lee administration, more than 180 journalists were penalized through dismissal or other sanctions for writing critical reports about government policies or promoting press freedom. More recently, on April 16, 2013, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) sent a letter to newly elected president Park Geun-hye urging her to intervene to secure the reinstatement of these dismissed journalists. The IFJ also pressed for further action to restore freedom of the press and media independence.³⁵

32 Arnold Zeitlin, "South Korean probe of newspapers raises serious free-press questions," *Freedom Forum*, July 10, 2001, <http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=14359&printerfriendly=1> (accessed October 2013).

33 June Woong Rhee, Hang Je Cho, Hyun Joo Song and June Hee Jung, "South Korean Media System: Toward a Democratization Model," 313-315.

34 Stephan Haggard and Jong-sung You, "Freedom of Expression in South Korea," Working paper (2013), 22.

35 Stephan Haggard and Jong-sung You, "Freedom of Expression in South Korea," 24.

Conclusion

As the *Donga Ilbo* Advertising Coercion and Forced Layoff Case highlights, the press is greatly influenced by power coalitions of the state and commercial forces. Commercially, there exists an “unbridgeable contradiction between participatory, democratic communication and capitalist modes of organization and practice”³⁶ that remains a fundamental problem for the media industry. And then there is the power of the state, which exists to control the press to its disadvantage. Further to these reasons, there is the post-democratic transition emergence of political parallelism and the rapid growth of the media market, both of which contribute to the structural limitations on press freedom. Thus, although the press has become free(er) since the end of authoritarian rule, government intervention, direct and indirectly via the market, still persists, hindering press freedom in South Korea. As the Kim Dae-jung and Lee Myung-bak cases show, the South Korean media is still to this day very much under the grasp of the state.

In 2011, Freedom House downgraded South Korea’s “freedom of the press” status from “Free” to “Partly Free,” while other international reports continue to raise concerns about restrictions on freedom of expression. Some may argue this dilemma is being mitigated with the rise of alternative media in South Korea.³⁷ An important example of this phenomenon is the rise in podcast news during the Lee Myung-bak presidency. Most popular of these podcasts was “Naggomsu” under *Ddanzi Ilbo* that challenged mainstream media. Whether the development of such alternative media will significantly impact the relationship between the press, the state and market forces is yet to be determined but worthy of further research. Y

36 Eun-gyoo Kim and James W. Hamilton, “Capitulation to capital? OhmyNews as alternative media,” *Media Culture Society*, Vol. 28, No. 4, (2006): 543.

37 Pinzon, Ramirez, et al. “Alternative Media.”

SECURITY THROUGH DEFAULT AND SWIFT DECLASSIFICATION: COOPERATION BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE CROWD INCREASES ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND RESOURCEFULNESS

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The intelligence community's best resource is the people they are protecting. The lessons learned between from events like the September 11 World Trade Center attack to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing are that the crowd is wise and creative enough to use the technology and intelligence available to help prevent and recover from manmade and natural crises. Slowing the flow of intelligence to the crowd endangers the lives and freedom of the people which then creates motivation for whistleblowers and leakers to acquire and distribute intelligence themselves. By declassifying most intelligences as a default, and swiftly declassifying old intelligence, the Intelligence Community can maintain critical secrets and preserve privacy while enabling the crowd to analyze and contribute to the body of intelligence to advance international security.

Introduction

The US Intelligence Community has proven to itself that crowds are wise and good at analysis. The public will use the tools they have to analyze information, and today these tools are the same that are used by professionals. Enabled with these tools and accurate information, crowds help solve crimes, save lives, and to recover from as well as prevent crises.

Default declassification introduces a narrow criterion that allows information and intelligence to be hidden as an alternative to current default classification. Swift declassification is investing in Intelligence Community insiders to release as much intelligence as possible as quickly as possible to save resources in the future and allow access to the information now. The public will acquire classified information if it is not given to them, through means such as leaks and whistleblowers. Hiding information also is not effective. The crowd will acquire and use that information to change the world, as seen in the influence of Wikileaks during the Arab Spring. Anticipating default and swift declassification, the parties and individuals affected by the new transparency would have time to change and seek reconciliation for their actions without transparency. Leaks and whistleblowing do not give time for the most diplomatic solutions.

The complications with increased transparency were detailed in David Brin's "Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom" in 1998.¹ He argued that transparency should be reciprocal and intelligence should be shared with the public. Today's debate is not about if intelligence will become available for the public, it is who will do it first. With default and swift declassification, the Intelligence Community can do their job better, using the crowd, to make the world safer.

Theory. The Virtuous Cycle: Accountability, Resourcefulness, and Transparency

For any human organization to function at its best, it needs three things: accountability, resourcefulness, and transparency. An organization evolves based on its feedback derived from how well a system uses resources and how confident this knowledge is, exemplified by the formula ($A=R*T$). Organizations are not zero-sum systems because resourcefulness and transparency work synergistically to create and improve an accountability system. Like its acronym ART, improving accountability, resourcefulness, and transparency has a steep learning curve initially but experience builds upon itself like learning a new language, instrument, or design program. This paper defines the Intelligence Community as an art and focuses on why default and swift declassification is more resourceful and transparent through better cooperation with "the crowd."

To extend the metaphor, a system focusing on resourcefulness and accountability without transparency is like a RAT, in formula, ($R=A/T$). The rat is an ingenious animal, which learns and adapts but can ruthlessly pursue its goals.

1 David Brin, *The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose between Privacy and Freedom?* (Reading, MA: Perseus, 1998).

They are symbolic of unseen destruction, from spreading disease to undermining a house's integrity by chewing through wires and walls. Fittingly, the word for corruption in Spanish is "mordida," or bitten. As one person becomes infected by corruption, they become contagious and can influence others to be corrupt and stall transparency, continuing the voracious cycle. A common fallacy against declassification is that privacy, security, and competitiveness will be lost, assuming Intelligence is a zero-sum game. Instead, crowds and Intelligence Communities that share information and communication tools are significantly more secure, robust, adaptable, and accurate.

An alternative is to accept lower quality service while being aware of the system's flaws. Transparency and accountability without resourcefulness, creates a dinosaur-like system, too big and slow to change, and stuck in TAR ($T=A/R$). Like the petroleum industry, the true cost includes war, maintaining oppressive regimes, and harm to people's health and their environment.² While these costs are known, the cost to change to a sustainable system is higher in the short term. Less-than-optimal short term decisions influence the future as a vulnerable cycle, as "Infrastructure is destiny."³ The slow and inflexible TAR system creates conditions for the clever rat to win. Information "wants" to be free. Fearing the outcome of sharing intelligence leads to less optimal dissemination because of leaks and whistleblowing. Default and swift declassification maintains security, privacy, and competitiveness more than whistleblowing, and leaks.

Finally, a system with transparency and resourcefulness but without accountability creates a vicious cycle that leads to poverty ($TR-A=P$). Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo explained how there is a difference in someone who is stuck in a poverty trap and someone who is just poor. The poverty trap is when a person or community have fallen into a vicious cycle, such as losing one's health and livelihood by getting sick from mosquitos, or being crushed under mounting debt on a farm. In a poverty trap, a big push like mosquito bed-nets or free fertilizer for one season can be effective and focused aid. However, if the situation is not an example of such a trap, then any aid is just a redistribution of wealth.⁴ Declassification can help discover who is trapped, what the underlying

2 Garth Lenz, "The true cost of oil," Filmed November 2011, TEDxVictoria video, Posted February 2012, http://www.ted.com/talks/garth_lenz_images_of_beauty_and_devastation.html.

3 Robin Chase, "A Conversation with Robin Chase," *Urban Omnibus and The Infrastructuralist*, June 2009, <http://urbanomnibus.net/2009/06/a-conversation-with-robin-chase>.

4 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, *Challenges of World Poverty*, (Lecture Notes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 2011), http://pooreconomics.com/sites/default/files/14.73_Intro_Lecture2.pdf.

ing causes are, and connect those people and communities with others who can help.

Without a doubt, the Intelligence Community can and must aspire to the highest levels of accountability, resourcefulness, and transparency. The price of secrecy is estimated at over US \$10 billion for the American government each year⁵ and over US \$1.5 trillion globally for the past 20 years.⁶ The cost of compromised civil liberties, including privacy and freedom of expression is not included in the equation, nor is the preciousness of life and diversity lost.

Experts are optimistic and show a number of signs that transparency is improving every year. These include constant improvements in the Price Waterhouse Coopers Opacity Index, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index, the number of Freedom of Information Acts passed within the US and internationally, and presence of more official Ombudsman in governments.⁷ This paper will focus on the improvements in transparency within the Intelligence Community in the US. The room for improvement is significant. Strict procedures for classifying new intelligence and speedy declassification of most archived intelligence would be a significant step towards a more secure and diplomatic world. Transparency does not mean less resourceful, effective, or efficient; a transparent Intelligence Community is better in the long run, offsetting any temporary costs for changing.

Research from the US Intelligence Community

The US Intelligence Community has been researching the benefits of using new technology for sharing information and analyzation, within the IC and with the public. After September 11, 2001, the US Intelligence Community made a concerted effort to share intelligence between agencies, as well as release more information to the public. Defense intelligence analyst Matthew S. Burton wrote “How the Web Can Relieve Our Information Glut and Get Us Talking to Each Other” in 2005. His aspiration was to help analysts connect the dots on security issues after the intelligence failures of 9/11. In 2006, the US Intelligence Community announced Intellipedia, a wiki-based site to share intelligence within the

5 Siobhan Gorman, “The Price of Secrecy: Billions,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 2010, blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/06/25/the-price-of-secrecy-billions/.

6 David Balaban, “Open Everything – Interview with Robert David Steele Vivas, Part 3,” *Privacy PC*, April 2013, <http://privacy-pc.com/interviews/open-everything-interview-with-robert-david-steele-vivas-part-3.html>.

7 Burkart Holzner and Leslie Holzner, *Transparency in Global Change*. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).

IC. Intellipedia helps resolve many of the long ingrained issues within the IC. “Intellipedia embraces the three core principles of social software in enterprise: work at the broadest audience possible; think topically, not organizationally; and replace existing business processes.... This not only helps build institutional memory over time, it provides a foundation upon which future intelligence can be based.”⁸ Intelligence failures occurred more from unorganized intelligence than from unknown variables. In this manner, the public is already assisting the construction of Intellipedia.

Interestingly, there have been several incidents when high-level personnel within the intelligence community have requested that some pages on the wiki be removed since they were too sensitive. What is stunning however is that these sites were exact copies of pages on Wikipedia. More than 90% of intelligence information is collated from open sources.⁹

The challenge is to declassify more of the remaining 10 percent of intelligence. Why limit this intelligence to a protected server when it could inform the broader informal intelligence community and public to make more informed choices and contribute to their own security?

Thomas Blanton of the National Security Archive outlined 5 steps to define what should be classified and what shouldn't. 1) Make intelligence unclassified as default; 2) Narrowly define exceptions; 3) Only classify the intelligence according to these exceptions if it can cause identifiable harm to a legitimate cause; 4) This harm to the cause must outweigh any gain from having the information open; and 5) An independent authority should mediate discrepancies.¹⁰ The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19: Freedom of opinion and expression (to seek, receive, and impart info) defines the narrow range when secrets are appropriate as when the good the transparency will bring is outweighed by the hardship it can cause to the rights and reputation of individuals, national security, public order, and public health/morals.

Judging by the intelligence released by Wikileaks, a significant amount of intelligence does not match these criteria and should immediately be declassified. Only the dangerous and necessarily private information should be secret—

8 Patrick Meier, “Intellipedia for Humanitarian Warning/Response?,” *iRevolution* (April 2009), <http://irevolution.net/2008/04/09/intellipedia-for-humanitarian-warningresponse/>.

9 Ibid.

10 Burkart Holzner and Leslie Holzner, *Transparency in Global Change* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).

information that clearly shouldn't be leaked by whistleblowers. This procedure should be complemented with the declassification of intelligence that also falls outside these narrow criteria.

The cost is minimal compared to the ever-increasing drain on resources created by the growing mountain of classified material that has to be protected — forever! It is a matter of priorities.... Judicious use of retired CIA officers to do declassification reviews could be done at relatively modest cost, leaving serving CIA officers to go about the current business of the Agency.¹¹

Declassifying intelligence frees resources while also helping the Intelligence Community to act like a wise crowd and improve analytical output.

NEEDED FOR WISE CROWDS ¹²	DESTROYS WISDOM OF CROWDS
Diversity of opinion (even outliers are important)	Homogeneity (lack of diversity)
Independence (opinions aren't determined by peers)	Imitation ("information cascade," lack of diversity)
Decentralization (specialized and local knowledge)	Centralization (distance) Division (silos)
Aggregation (collect and make a collective decision)	Emotionality (peer pressure, herd instinct, collective hysteria)

According to James Surowiecki, a crowd needs four things to act wise: diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization, and aggregation.¹³ Opening intelligence promotes the diversity and independence needed for wise crowds. The professional analysts benefit from the added variety and accountability. In 2011, Clint Watts, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, showed the groupthink in the experts. He started a survey about future terrorism issues among experts and a random sample of people. Five days after the start of the survey, Osama bin Laden was killed.

11 Warren F. Kimball, "Openness and the CIA," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter-Spring 2001, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a08p.htm>.

12 James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations*, (Anchor, 2005).

13 Ibid.

The crowd demonstrated the potential to be swayed by popular sentiment or media reporting. For example, the academics in the sample clustered around one answer before Bin Laden's death and then shifted en masse to another answer after his death. This raises important questions about whether to use outside academic experts to fill knowledge gaps in government communities or for assistance with estimating the future course of events.¹⁴

However, instead of dismissing academics and experts as a whole, the researchers considered research by Philip Tetlock and Isaiah Berlin, who were able to separate the outliers from masses influenced by their peers. Compared to the average sampling, the outliers regularly gave a variety of different answers, were more likely to write their explanation on the survey, and were more accurate. Tetlock noticed that people who were more knowledgeable in many topics (foxes) were better at forecasting than experts in one area (hedgehogs).

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) funded a similar project called Aggregative Contingent Estimation.¹⁵ It is aimed at making better predictions of events through crowdsourcing forecasters. The most accurate members were pooled as the Good Judgment Project and paid US \$150 a year for their predictions about various topics. IARPA also found that hedgehogs were useful for thinking of sub-questions on the topics given.¹⁶

Advanced QUestion Answering for INTelligence (AQUAINT) was another program developed at IARPA. They endeavored to teach computers how to find patterns and make predictions using big data like members of the Good Judgment Project.¹⁷ Machine learning and data mining is most effective in a tight set of parameters: "1) The nature and composition of the underlying data are not changing over time; 2) The data is complete and clean; and 3) You have some idea of what you're looking for."¹⁸ This is not the typical case when looking for "unknown unknowns," or when viewing messy data from something like the Twitter "fire hose" or Prism feed. Accordingly, the Intelligence Community has

14 Clint Watts and John E. Brennan, "Hunting for foxes: Capturing the Potential of Outlier Ideas in the Intelligence Community" *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 55, No. 4. 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-4/pdfs-vol.-55-no.-4/Brennan-Reflections%20on%20Outliers-13Jan.pdf>.

15 IARPA, 2013, <http://forecastingace.com/aces/>.

16 Michael Peck, "US intelligence researchers seek public help with forecasting experiment," *C4ISR Journal*, August 2011, http://www.iarpa.gov/Programs/ia/ACE/articles/C4ISR_Journal_article_on_forecasting.pdf.

17 James Bamford, "The New Thought Police: The NSA Wants to Know How You Think—Maybe Even What You Think" *Nova*, 2009. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/nsa-police.html>.

18 Palantir, "What we believe," <http://www.palantir.com/what-we-believe/>.

been pursuing combination of human pattern finding prowess with data surfacing programs.

Chess has been a frontier for comparing geniuses and artificial intelligence. Computers surpassed the best chess-playing humans when Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov in 1997. After, competitors began looking at making better computer models to battle each other. In “freestyle chess” there is flexibility in how many humans and computer systems can play in a game. In 2005, a team of amateurs with 4 programs networked together rose to stardom. Their team was named Hydra, after the multi-headed mythological dragon. They beat significantly more sophisticated software as well as world champion chess players by combining human problem solving power with simple but deep analytical tools. The model—commodity hardware networked together and moderately skilled humans—is now used for forecasting real world events as well. Palantir is one software tool used to show multiple data sets to a user at once so they can search for correlations or aberrant subjects within the data set. It runs on Lucene (an open source search engine), Cassandra (an open source data warehousing server), and Hadoop (open source and resource gentle MapReduce framework).

Palantir’s platform is deployed against terrorism, human trafficking, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, fraud, waste and abuse, child pornography rings and food borne illness. Palantir says its technology is helping public and private sector clients to stop the next Bernie Madoff, genocide in the Sudan, gang violence, Medicare fraud and cyber espionage, and lower the cost of pharmaceutical R&D.¹⁹

Georgetown University journalism students successful solved the mystery of the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Pakistan.²⁰ They successfully matched veins in the hands of the murders in the video to the veins of a torturer in another video.²¹ Health care workers could compare Medicare data representing 100 million claims, 1 billion medical procedures, 30 million individual beneficiaries, and 700,000 physicians, and PubMed data representing 22 million biomedical journal articles. They could see possible insurance fraud

19 CNBC, “Disruptor 50: Palantir” May, 2013, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/100734736>

20 “The Pearl Project released its findings on the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.” [Georgetown University, 2010], <http://pearlproject.georgetown.edu>.

21 “Project Pearl: The Bravest Class in Town,” MarieClaire, August 2008, www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/news/terrorism-daniel-pearl-fbi-2.

cases, as well as optimize treatment and funding options.²² It also reportedly helped in the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Palantir, which is free for non-profits, enables average people with average computer systems to analyze and solve major world issues from home.

Hadoop is a key element of Palantir that distributes data processing over many average computers, forming an inexpensive supercomputer that can handle big data across every range of parameters. The program can also be used on networked computers in remote locations, taking advantage of unused computers in the cloud. It is comparable to the chess program Hydra on a massive scale. Businesses and governments with access to big data are using it to gain insight into consumer and constituent behavior. Hadoop's scale and accessibility has changed the way policy makers and major businesses are making choices.²³ The system would hold "essentially every kind of data there is," said Randy Garrett, who was then director of technology for the NSA's integrated intelligence program. "The object is to do things that were essentially impossible before."²⁴

Using big data tools to analyze expected correlations of data is not new. The revolutionary aspect is that any amateur user can casually look at various perspectives of combined data swiftly to find unexpected patterns in Palantir and Hadoop. Analysis and forecasting are then only limited to who has access to the big data. Default declassifying intelligence would make Palantir more powerful for the public; every piece of information is encoded with access level, only the users with the right credentials could see sensitive information. Palantir's secure infrastructure makes it well suited for international security. "Everything a user does in Palantir creates a trail that can be audited. No Russian spy, jealous husband or Edward Snowden can use the tool's abilities without leaving an indelible record of his or her actions."²⁵

The focus on accountability with Palantir was intentional, as the founders included Paypal founder Peter Thiel, an avowed libertarian, and Alex Karp, who has a Ph.D in philosophy.

22 Ari Geshner. "Palantir at StrataRX 2012: Doing Big Data By Yourself," *Palantir blog*, June 2013. <http://www.palantir.com/2013/06/stratarx-2012-doing-big-data-by-yourself>.

23 Andrew Leonard, "Netflix, Facebook — and the NSA: They're all in it together" *Salon*, June 2013. www.salon.com/2013/06/14/netflix_facebook_and_the_nsa_theyre_all_in_it_together.

24 Siobhan Gorman, Adam Entous, and Andrew Dowell. "Technology Emboldened the NSA Advances in Computer, Software Paved Way for Government's Data Dagnet" *Wall Street Journal*, June 2013 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323495604578535290627442964.html>,

25 Andy Greenberg, "How A 'Deviant' Philosopher Built Palantir, A CIA-Funded Data-Mining Juggernaut," *Forbes*, August, 2013 <http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/14/agent-of-intelligence-how-a-deviant-philosopher-built-palantir-a-cia-funded-data-mining-juggernaut/3>.

In a post-9/11 world Thiel wanted to sell those Palantiri-like powers to the growing national security complex: His concept for Palantir was to use the fraud-recognition software designed for PayPal to stop terrorist attacks. But from the beginning the libertarian saw Palantir as an antidote to—not a tool for—privacy violations in a society slipping into a vise of security. “It was a mission-oriented company,” says Thiel, who has personally invested \$40 million in Palantir and today serves as its chairman. “I defined the problem as needing to reduce terrorism while preserving civil liberties.”²⁶

This helps clarify why the public has access to the same enterprise technology the CIA is using; the founders believe in checking the vast power the IC has access to with the same tools.

Security data analyst Raffael Marty predicts that by 2020, defense will be impossible, particularly from cyber warfare. “Defense relies on past knowledge. [It’s] reactive, always behind. Unknown and new threats won’t be detected. Imperfect patterns and rules cause a lot of false positives. Data mining algorithms are built for numerical, not categorical data,” and take too many parameters, assumptions, and processing power.²⁷ His solution is to have systems monitored by people looking at data visually in real time. “Put the human in the loop for understanding, pattern detection, remembering context, fantastic intuition, having predictive capabilities built in.”²⁸ Having live monitoring is more resourceful if relying on open source software, crowd-sourced labor, and pooled best practices. Limiting the amount of data and secrets to be protected efficiently conserves resources for important matters.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb takes an encouraging perspective of the worst case scenario in his book *Black Swan*. He states that history is comprised of many low probability high impact events. Trying to predict the unpredictable is not practical; he suggests building robustness against the knowable outcomes of unpredictable events.²⁹ An example from “Nate Silver’s *The Signal and the Noise*” is that we know what regions have frequent earthquakes although we can not

26 Andy Greenberg, “How A ‘Deviant’ Philosopher Built Palantir, A CIA-Funded Data-Mining Juggernaut,” *Forbes*, August, 2013 <http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/14/agent-of-intelligence-how-a-deviant-philosopher-built-palantir-a-cia-funded-data-mining-juggernaut/2>.

27 Raffael Marty, “Cyber Security: How Visual Analytics Unlock Insight,” Lecture Notes, KDD Industry Practice Expo, August 2013, <http://www.slideshare.net/zrlram/kdd-2013-dm-challenges>.

28 Marty, *Ibid.*

29 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan*, (Random House, 2007).

predict when they will occur, so we can make buildings resistant and people more ready for when they do happen.³⁰

In the book *Antifragile*, Talib dives deeper into the positive outcomes from improbable events. Modern life is filled with fragile structures. Salaried employment has the catastrophic risk of losing one's job. Debt-fueled economies risks implosion. Modern societies push efficiency so hard there isn't enough slack for accidents. Alternatively, we can be antifragile. We can purposely expose ourselves to stress like irregular meal times and violent exercise. We can also invest in things with limited downsides and non-linear unlimited upsides.³¹ Maintaining vast quantities of classified information is inherently fragile, as there is "concave" and disastrous risk of being exposed compared to the strength gained from more people being able to utilize the intelligence. Declassification and encouraging people to network to use each other's data is a more robust method of security.

Application: Increased Declassification Aids Security

In the aftermath of the April 15, 2013 Boston marathon bombing people turned to the Internet to participate in the recovery. The effort of local residents was critical to a speedy recovery after the bombing. In the first hour, over two thousand people from disparate communities used Twitter, Google forms, and Google spreadsheets to coordinate distribution of water, food, and shelter.³² Local Wi-Fi hot spots were opened so people could locate loved ones and share information.

Twitter and Reddit communities attempted to determine the suspects. They "posted pictures taken from the bomb scene and engaged in a large-scale, semi-organized effort to identify the bombers. At one point, users even compiled a spreadsheet of possible suspects, whom they sought to identify." The search lead to one suspect, Sunil Tripathi, and "by morning on the East Coast, Tripathi's name had already been circulated in the press in India and Britain." The conjecture was wrong, but it contributed to the FBI releasing the suspected bombers pictures and videos April 18.³³ Boston Police Commissioner Edward Davis said the release "was a turning point in the investigation, no doubt about

30 Nate Silver, *The Signal and the Noise*, (Penguin Press, 2012).

31 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragile*, (Random House, 2012).

32 Patrick Meier, "Self-Organized Crisis Response to #BostonMarathon Attack," *iRevolution*, April 2013, <http://irevolution.net/2013/04/16/bostonmarathon-attack>.

33 Gerry Shih, "Boston Marathon bombings: How Twitter and Reddit got it wrong," *Independent*, April 2013, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/boston-marathon-bombings-how-twitter-and-reddit-got-it-wrong-8581167.html>.

it.”³⁴ The suspects, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, were located while fleeing Boston by tracing the phone of a hostage who escaped from a stolen car. Dzhokhar was arrested and Tamerlan was killed during the pursuit.

Patrick Meier, a blogger and advisory board member for the Crisis Map web service Ushahidi described the informal network of helpers as “the crowd.” Empowering the people within the crisis with timely access to intelligence can mitigate the limited service and focus of professional help immediately following a crisis. In this case, the crowd created an ad hoc marketplace to redistribute goods and care.

Getting the information that comes from the crowd and feeding it back. They probably need that information more than the first responders, because who are the real first responders? The disaster affected population themselves. The crowd will always be there. By definition, the crowd is always there and the crowd is many.³⁵

Secrets, which can delay the effectiveness of crowd actions, can cost lives. When provided with information that it requires, the crowd is capable of resolving many problems. The emergent nature of crowd feeding helps non-professionals to become their own Intelligence Community.

An example of professional directed crowd feeding was the application called Dagens Nyheter started by Doctors at Swedish hospital Sodersjukhuset. Normal people are trained to help victims of cardiac arrest. When someone is having a heart attack, the closest volunteer is sent a text message with the location to help before professionals can arrive. Survival rate rose from 3 percent before the application to 10.9 now.³⁶ The IC can share their experiences with the new home analysts in the same way the Swedish doctors trained volunteers to help locally. “Managers must trust their officers to share directly with each other and with the policy community. A manager’s role will become less command and control and more teacher of tradecraft and communicator of purpose and objectives.”³⁷ Surely the experts in the IC will have new perspectives and

34 Milton J. Valencia, “Boston Police Commissioner Edward Davis says releasing photos was “turning point” in Boston Marathon bomb probe,” *Boston Globe*, <http://boston.com/2013/04/20/boston-police-commissioner-edward-davis-says-releasing-photos-was-turning-point-boston-marathon-bomb-probe/sojcZNcTCGah8UYBnRuk9O/story.html#sthash.i7Egqr8p.dpuf>.

35 Patrick Meier, “Collaborative Crisis Mapping,” Presentation at the Emergency Social Data Summit organized by the Red Cross in Washington DC, August 2010, <http://youtu.be/4ANZd6v9qIc>.

36 Steve Kelman, “A Public/Private Partnership that is Saving Lives,” *The Lecture*, October 2013, <http://few.com/blogs/lectern/2013/10/stockholm-public-private.aspx>.

37 D. Calvin Andrus, “Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community” *Studies in Intelligence*, vol

insight to share as well, which can only strengthen international security if the public can learn from them. 60 percent of the CIA is already contractors,³⁸ so a move to embrace the informal Intelligence community is the next step of distributing analytical labor to more diverse and local talents.

Opening national security is necessary in an interconnected world. The Boston marathon bombing demonstrated the international nature of today's security environment. The Tsarnaev were born in the USSR and Kyrgyzstan. Their reported motives were connected to US foreign policy and the Iraq War and War in Afghanistan. The Russian Federation informed the US of their danger 18 months before the attack.³⁹ The one of the three spectators killed was a student from China, and the hostage who led to the arrest was also from China. Security experts are distributed across the world, and connecting them with local experts is key to preventing and resolving future crises.

What distinguishes today's tests and makes the traditional intelligence paradigm less effective is the transnational and global character of many trends.... The compression of time and space and the easy movement of people, weapons, toxins, drugs, knowledge and ideas have transformed the way threats emerge and challenge the way intelligence must operate... planned and launched from many different countries, making the individual actions of any single government or intelligence service ineffective in detecting, deterring or preventing those attacks... many of these the international community's "blind spots," which our current analytical lenses are not to make sense of....⁴⁰

Future extremists must consider that the crowd is an active participant in its own security. Even for lone wolf terrorists like the Tsarnaev, photos incidentally including them can lead to identification and alert citizens can find them hiding in boats behind their houses. In contrast to the Big Brother top-down surveillance

49, no 3, 2004, https://cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/Wik_and_%20Blog_7.htm.

38 Jesse Finck and James Bamford, "Q&A: James Bamford author of *The Puzzle Palace*, on the CIA's brain drain under Bush," *Mother Jones*, October 2008. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/09/qa-james-bamford>.

39 Eileen Sullivan and Julie Pace, "Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, Bombing Suspect's Mom, Also on Terror List," *Huffington Post*, (Retrieved May 1, 2013), April 26, 2013.

40 Roger Z. George, "Meeting 21st Century Transnational Challenges: Building a Global Intelligence Paradigm" *CSI Studies*, vol 51, no 3, September 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/building-a-global-intelligence-paradigm.html>.

society, a surveillance network of the crowd, especially when working with the professional Intelligence Community, is more wise, local, and effective.

The outreach of professional communities to recruit amateurs for analysis is apparent in the increase in the number and complexity of crowdsourcing websites. Liza Alert is a Russian website for finding lost children with 1300 members, 50-70 are active weekly. There are sites for analyzing and classifying photographs, such as satellite data on river-like deltas on Mars on cerberusgame.com or Australian wildfires with Tomnod.com. Users have access to 225 cameras in Tanzania to see and report how species interact with each other on Snapshot Serengeti. Ancient texts and dolphin's sounds are being translated. Users analyze folding dynamics of proteins with FoldIt and RNA with EteRNA, which can then be used to identify disease and create medicine. Computers watch how humans solve the problem to create better algorithms to look at data. On EyeWire, users map the neural pathways of retinas. According to Linus's Law, named after the founder of Linux, "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow."⁴¹ Author Clay Shirky estimated the educated population of the world has over 1 trillion hours a year of unutilized time, which can be used for complex, crowd-based collaborations.⁴² He argues that creating infrastructure that enables collaboration is the best way to capture that lost energy. For the Intelligence community, that requires sharing information, and also sharing the responsibility of analysis.

The Alternative. Leaks and Whistleblowers

If the Intelligence Community doesn't provide transparency though broad, timely, and default declassification, then individuals will feel morally compelled to correct the power asymmetry and become whistleblowers or create information leaks. Transparency is here to protect privacy of the powerless against the powerful. It is critical in any liberal system. The number of leaks and whistleblowers is thus increasing, as there is more need for transparency and accountability to balance the new technology of the Intelligence Community.

It should be understood that transparency does not mean the end of secrets and privacy. In fact, it is through the artful use of transparency that one's power is shown but also tempered and hubris is avoided. Julian Assange sees transparency as a tool for balance, and doesn't expect any person to give up their rights.

41 Eric S. Raymond, *The Cathedral and the Bazaar*, (O'Reilly Media, 1999), p. 30.

42 Clay Shirky, "How cognitive surplus will change the world," *Ted@Cannes*, Filmed June 2010, Posted June 2010, http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cognitive_surplus_will_change_the_world.html.

Transparency should be proportional to the power that one has. The more power one has, the greater the dangers generated by that power, and the more need for transparency. Conversely, the weaker one is, the more danger there is in being transparent.” In other words, if information is power, then what the transparency movement is trying to do is correct an asymmetric power relationship.⁴³

Developments in the defense industry and Intelligence Community make the choices clear: governments can choose declassification, or accountability will be attained through the threat and exercise of less optimal releases of intelligence through journalism, whistleblowing, and leaks. If the organization, government or Intelligence Community is not voluntarily transparent, individuals are conflicted morally and become civilly disobedient to correct the perceived imbalance.

When confronted with what he perceived as injustice, Edward Snowden revealed the US PRISM intelligence program was collecting unprecedented information on international users of US based websites. As declassification was not a valid recourse, he became a whistleblower.

Snowden...tried to act as principled and professional in his whistleblowing as he could. What he did instead was give up his life of career stability and economic prosperity, living with his long-time girlfriend in Hawaii, in order to inform his fellow citizens ... by very carefully selecting which documents he thought should be disclosed and concealed, then gave them to a newspaper with a team of editors and journalists and repeatedly insisted that journalistic judgments be exercised about which of those documents should be published in the public interest and which should be withheld. That’s what every single whistleblower and source for investigative journalism, in every case, does—by definition.⁴⁴

This is complicating relations between the US and its allies and trading partners. If the US anticipated the declassification of this knowledge, they could have made a formal press release about how increasing international security

43 David Le Bailly and Julian Assange, “Julian Assange: ‘I have no choice. Publish or Perish,’” trans. Mark K. Jensen, *Paris Match*, December 2010, <http://wlcenral.org/node/876>.

44 Glenn Greenwald, “On the Espionage Act charges against Edward Snowden: Who is actually bringing ‘injury to America’: those who are secretly building a massive surveillance system or those who inform citizens that it’s being done?” *Guardian*, June 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/22/snowden-espionage-charges>.

is a priority shared with their allies, and could have worked together to find an acceptable way to share information. As the countries being monitored had records of potential threats within their countries, cross-declassification would ameliorate the same situations better than PRISM. For example, the Russian government informed the US government about the threat of Tamerlan Tsarnaev but the Boston marathon bombings were not prevented. Alternatively, if the public, especially the Boston law enforcement agencies, knew what threats to be aware of, the tragedy may have been stopped early. Further, if Tamerlan Tsarnaev knew that his participation with extremists contributed to his difficulty gaining American citizenship and better employment, he could have made better choices than violence.

On August 21, 2013, Private Manning pleaded guilty and was charged for releasing classified materials to WikiLeaks. Manning did not know how to clean the material himself, nor could he have cleaned the volume alone. The Collateral Murder video was carefully prepared for the media by Wikileaks to represent the embarrassing, illegal, and unethical actions taking place in Iraq by the US military. However, the subsequent Cablegate leak did expose a large number of uncritical documents. According to the ideals of Blanton, these never needed to be classified initially. Contrast with the opinion of Bowman H. Miller, the leaks were belligerent and it was wrong to give them to an Wikileaks instead of journalists because it had a shallow institutional history and little stake in releasing all the files they did.

Bona fide journalists operate cognizant of an ethical code which, despite their calling to hold government to account, helps to govern their actions and underline their responsibility in dealing with national security issues and information; secondly, those journalists write for a public, large or small, and have a purpose and are selective in their reporting. On the other hand, WikiLeaks' actions have no stated purpose beyond disclosing, without restraint, what it illicitly has received from unnamed sources. Contrary to some claims, the leaker of the vast amounts of Department of State and other reporting was not and is not a whistle-blower. That name only deserves to be used for those revealing embarrassing, illegal, unethical, or negligent behavior by those enjoying the public's trust and confidence. The WikiLeaks leaker defies this definition.⁴⁵

45 Bowman H. Miller, "The Death of Secrecy: Need to Know...with Whom to Share," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol 55, No 3, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-3/the-death-of-secrecy-need-to-know...with-whom-to-share.html>.

Manning stated the motivation to release the files was to stimulate a public discussion about open diplomacy. Reuters tried to attain the video in 2007 through the Freedom of Information act unsuccessfully, so Manning was compelled to take the files and share them with Wikileaks secretly. Declassification and following the Freedom of Information act could have avoided the shock from the sudden revelations following the Wikileaks cable gate leaks assisted by Private Manning.

By exposing hidden secrets, double standards, and hypocrisy by Arab leaders they provided new perspectives on Arab politics as well as confirming widespread suspicions, and thus put angry publics in direct confrontation with autocratic governments. Wikileaks offered critical information, contributed to the mass “mediatization” of events both local and internationally, and helped formulate and clarify the critique of the existing political situation and democratic alternatives.⁴⁶

The truth has enormous power, and the holders of the truth have the responsibility to see that it is available to the public for making informed choices, but also that the public has informed in an honest manner to maintain respect and civility through change. For example, if the leaders of the Middle East and North African countries were aware of impending declassification, a discourse with the public could have been started earlier to avoid the embarrassment and violence when other people tell your secrets first. Declassification forces leaders to be diplomatic and mature. On the same point, leaders throughout the international community must anticipate and should participate in declassification, as a leak in one country leads to riots on the other side of the planet.

Default and swift declassification is the best way to help the public make informed choices and provide for their own security. If those benefiting from the lack of transparency must wait until leaks and whistleblowing reveal them, many continue because of a bias to ignore high-risk low probability events and to discount the future. If declassification is chosen, then the beneficiaries must confront their choices. Given today’s complex legal system, privacy is one of the only protections for many people committing crimes they see as innocent and victimless. Declassification will reveal how much our laws must mature with the times to create a safer world. For liberal societies, the rule of law is

46 Ibrahim Saleh “Wikileaks and the Arab Spring: The Twists and Turns of Media, Culture and Power.” *Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications for the Future of Communications, Journalism and Society* [2013], 245-253.

critical, but so is the evolution of law through the comfort of privacy and loopholes of religious freedom that provide space to participate in breaking laws and proving they are not needed. Leaks and whistleblowing, though noble in cause, are inferior to the public demanding declassification. It is in the public's interest to protect their privacy with transparency created ethically and with time to allow those endangered by it to come clean first, seek amnesty and show that they will act better in a different future, or highlight why the laws need to be updated. We must amend the adage "You have nothing to fear if you've done nothing wrong," with "but something must change if the law and society don't correspond."

Assange suggests another possible solution: to start encrypting information more. But default encryption is an extremely fragile cycle to continue to encrypt and hide more information that can lead to the keys to the other encryption. Even Osama bin Laden could not completely remove himself from the grid of society.

Biometric data gathering, facial recognition technology, domestic drone surveillance, and the strategic intersection of all private communication: these are the four horsemen of Assange's apocalypse. ... Now even a country like Libya can afford systems like Eagle, a product sold by the French firm Amesys and used by the Gaddafi regime for mass interception of communication. Even poor countries are setting up surveillance systems: as Muller-Maguhn claims, African countries are getting entire spy network infrastructure as a gift from the Chinese, who expect to be paid back "in data, the new currency."⁴⁷

Declassification will help protect and keep citizens aware of invasions of privacy from others. The future of intelligence and the wise crowd could be further distributed with technologies that bypass central authorities. The wireless mesh technology can link mobile devices directly together to share data. Instead of needing to contact a centrally connected cell tower, each phone or wireless router acts as an access point to each other, allowing users to bounce signals off each other to communicate with users across the continent, or to safe access points in other countries or satellites in orbit. This can have significant impact in countries with oppressive governments as power slips away. The mesh could be activated with hardware already installed in current mobile devices with a

47 Adam Morris, "Julian Assange: The Internet threatens civilization." *Salon*, May 2013, http://www.salon.com/2013/04/30/tk_5_partner_15.

software update. More than 70 organizations have made wireless mesh methods, and progress may be seen after choosing a standard such as IEEE 802.11s: Standard for WLAN Mesh Networking.

Governments are now struggling with services like Weibo and Twitter, but true meshed wireless will possibly be the key for the crowd to negotiate for more rights and privileges, creating the Dictator's Dilemma balancing "information communication technology for economic development with their need to control the democratizing influences of this technology."⁴⁸ Patrick Meier wrote about how the Chinese government was already trying to physically block citizens from helping each other after the Lushan earthquake in April 2013, when they could have used the volunteers to help recovery.⁴⁹ Increased communication and analytical ability through modern technology is inevitable. Declassifying first can lessen the amount of leaks and whistleblowers. It is in the best interest of the International Intelligence Community, to treat the crowd with respect, train them in tradecraft and ways to help each other, and focus on mutual goals of a more peaceful and just global community.

Conclusion

The role of the Intelligence Community as the keeper of secrets and pinnacle of wisdom is being challenged by their own research. The goal of internal peace and security is best pursued through cooperation and honesty. The recent increases in technology have given governments broad and extreme powers, which the public has fought against with leaks and whistleblowing. Crowds help with security because they are wise and local. Publically available tools like Palatir and Hadoop, and intelligence through technology like spreadsheets, Twitter, and wireless meshes also increase the power of the public, amplifying any mistakes they make. Default and swift declassification combines the best of tradecraft, technology, and the virtues of crowdsourcing. Mistakes are minimized, and the service to peace and security are maximized. **Y**

48 Rachel Naomi Fredman, "The Dictator's Dilemma and the Politics of Telecommunications in Cuba: A Case Study" April 2012, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2043679.

49 Patrick Meier, "How Crowdsourced Disaster Response in China Threatens the Government," *iRevolution*, May 2013, <http://irevolution.net/2013/05/21/crowdsource-response-china-quake>.

EMERGING DONORS AND KNOWLEDGE SHARING FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF KOREA

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The field of international development cooperation has been heavily influenced by “emerging donors”, countries which have seen significant development and which have begun to form their own international development programs. Countries like South Korea are capitalizing on their own development history to engage developing countries to learn from successful past policy experiences. However South Korea’s burgeoning knowledge sharing programs present an important set of pitfalls; the state’s quasi-monopoly over how the country’s past development is interpreted, along with the narrow conception of the development experiences to be shared both limit the effectiveness of exporting such policies. Korea can capitalize on the wealth of lessons from its past development on the international stage if it presents a convincing heterodox paradigm for development while opening up interpretations of the past to wider societal debate, and if it shifts to an understanding of its own development history which transcends sole economic interpretations.

Introduction

The past few years have seen the beginnings of two large shifts in international aid to developing countries. Firstly, the 2008 financial crisis has precipitated a gradual retreat of “traditional” Western donors from the center-stage of development aid, and has begun to place new actors closer to the spotlight. The fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea in 2011 confirmed this trend, with its focus on incorporating new strategies in planning and financing development through the private sector and emerging donor countries.¹

¹ Shannon Kindornay and Fraser Reilly-King, “Investing in the Business of Development: Bilateral Approaches to Engaging the Private Sector,” *The North-South Institute and the Canadian Council for*

Secondly, and in complement to the first trend, the gradual rise of middle-income economies such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey has heralded the rise of new development aid donors, “emerging donors” which have seen significant economic progress over the past decades and which have developed sizeable foreign aid programs. These emerging donors’ contributions to international development aid are firstly quantitative in nature: South-South Cooperation, and especially aid flows by BRIC countries have dramatically increased in the last few years. The aid flows from China, India and Brazil alone have gone from close to US \$38 billion in 2006 to over US \$60 billion in 2011.²

Certainly the rise to prominence of emerging donor countries is an ongoing process, and competition with the sheer scale of aid from the United States and Western Europe is still not comparable. But countries such as South Korea, China, Turkey, Brazil and others are increasingly developing their own approaches and methods to helping other countries. They are namely mobilizing lessons learned from their own histories of development, sharing experiences and adapting older policies and ideas to the new century.³

The Republic of South Korea (below, Korea) is one of these few countries to have gone from aid recipient to aid donor. In the 1950s and 60s, South Korea was just emerging from the devastating Korean War and had a per capita GDP lower than the Philippines and an industrial base all but decimated in the war. In just four decades, however, Korea graduated to middle, then high-income country status, and now leads the world in key industries such as electronics and shipbuilding.

Korea is also one of just two members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee to have previously received foreign development assistance. With a rapidly expanding foreign aid budget, Korea has heavily invested in development cooperation programs that capitalize on lessons from its own past economic growth. As such understanding, packaging and bringing into action the Korean development experience is central to the future of Korea’s international development cooperation. However to ensure effectiveness, Korea will need to shape its knowledge sharing programs into more coherent, open initiatives which promote a truly pragmatic look into its rich development history.

International Co-operation working paper (2013): 1-93.

2 Daniel Poon, “South-South Trade, Investment and Aid Flows,” *July Policy Brief*, (2013). The North-South Institute.

3 Emma Mawdsley, *From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape* (London: Zed Books, 2012).

Korea's experience-based aid initiatives are relatively young, and are encountering problems which could threaten their meaningfulness and positive impact on less developed countries. Korea (and by extension, all of the emerging donors who are in the beginning phases of formulating their development cooperation)⁴ must seriously reexamine and address a number of potential shortcomings endemic to their aid systems.

Analyzing Past Policies

The Korean government's Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) has been the flagship of its development experience-based cooperation since its inception in 2004. The program engages low- and middle-income countries on questions of economic and social development policy, finding and assisting in the implementation of policy solutions and recommendations based on Korea's own low- and middle-income past. In 2011, the program partnered with twenty-five countries in KSP initiatives. KSP also uses researchers affiliated with the state's Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy to publish extensive analysis on topics in Korea's economic development, in a project called the "modularization" of Korea's development experience.⁵

The program is bringing forward alternative policies derived from Korea's own development experience and has the potential to act as a channel for heterodox economic policy formulation and implementation in developing countries. These policies include designing export initiatives fueled by monetary policy and central bank control in the Dominican Republic, or again protecting domestic industries as a part of economic diversification in Gabon.⁶

In many instances, the tools of policy have changed with time: KSP's policy recommendations are not a carbon copy of the policies which saw Korea's rise over the last half century. Protectionist trade policies, for example, are not actively or often advocated, and while emphasis is placed on developing export-orientated growth strategies, this is advocated more through gradual deregulation than through industrial policies.

Changes in the policy toolbox notwithstanding, a careful examination of

4 While the phenomenon of new development aid donors can be ascribed to the rise in the past two decades of middle-income countries and regional powers in certain parts of the world, including the BRICS, there are instances of emerging donors engaging in knowledge sharing programs as early as the 1970s and 1980s. This is the case of Japan's Kaizen development methodology and of Brazil's social protection programs such as *Bolsa Familia*.

5 Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Government of Korea, "The Current State of and Future Engagement on KSP's Modularization" (2010).

6 Korea Development Institute Center for International Development, "Moving to the Diversification of the Gabonese Economy: Lessons Learned from Korea" (2012).

KSP policy recommendations to other countries along with the contents of the KSP modularization shows that the goals of policy remain very similar to those advanced during Korea's low- and middle-income years.⁷ These are namely that of deepening national industrial capabilities (through economic restructuring and a simultaneous export oriented and domestic market-centered approaches) and that of creating a knowledge-based economy, which prizes research and development, information technology and higher-value inputs to increase total factor productivity.⁸

While keeping intact the basic goals of Korean development policy in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, KSP is adapting Korea's own development experiences to the realities of developing countries today.

Growing Pains

However despite the efforts of the Knowledge Sharing Program, Korea's development experience-based cooperation efforts have several clear limitations which reduce the effectiveness and meaning in harnessing successful development stories.

Firstly, there are factors which inhibit the scale, scope and efficiency of Korean aid in a larger sense. The majority of these factors are well-known in the Korean development policy community,⁹ and have recently been highlighted in the 2012 OECD Development Assistance Committee's peer review of Korea's development assistance. They include low overall levels of ODA to GNI (0.12 percent in 2011) and a high ratio of tied to untied aid (68 percent to 32 percent in 2010).¹⁰ In addition Korean aid faces the dual challenge of aligning its thematic focuses with its various country partner strategies and better incorporating results-based management frameworks into projects on the ground in developing countries.

One other main critique, not highlighted in the Peer Review, pertains to the overall goals of Korean aid. Critics have often identified Korean aid as "flag aid", which aims more to advance the visibility or image of the donor country than to achieve development in the recipient country. The high level of tied aid

7 Korea Development Institute and the Market Economy Research Institute. "A Market Analysis Interpretation of Korean Economic Development's Policy Lessons" (2010).

8 Sangwoo Nam, "Korea's Economic Development Experience: Implications for Developing Countries," *Journal of Korea's Development Cooperation* 1 (2010).

9 ODA Watch, "Parallel Report on Korea's International Development Cooperation" *European Network on Debt and Development Working Paper* (2012).

10 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development "Peer Review: Korea" Development Assistance Committee (2012).

has also led to the accusation that Korean aid serves primarily as an entry point for Korean businesses by tying assistance to deal with Korean companies. The recent emphasis being placed on public-private partnerships (PPP) for infrastructure construction in developing countries, facilitated by Korean aid money, has lent weight to this view.¹¹

All these limitations have been debated at length leading up to and since the 2012 Peer Review. To the extent that they inhibit the development of aid programs in general, these elements also adversely affect the operation and positioning of knowledge and experience-sharing programs.

In the wake of the publishing of the 2012 Peer Review results, there has been a concerted effort on the part of both the Korean government and Korean civil society to address the main obstacles highlighted by the review team. However, despite a general agreement in the Korean aid community on the need for reform, the specific policies in question are still a matter of debate. In response to the Peer Review, the Korean government is proposing gradual changes, focused on the size of Korea's aid package and the way in which it monitors aid. These changes include engagements to increase overall official Development Assistance (ODA), increasing the portion of untied grant aid in Korea's ODA allocations, and improving aid programme evaluation processes for better results-based management.¹²

Other voices in the Korean aid community, notably in civil society, are pointing out that while progress on certain fronts (notably in increasing the size of overall ODA) is being made, other more fundamental issues are being left by the wayside. Civil society has held campaigns for more accountable and efficient Korean aid, most recently advocating that Korea join the International Aid Transparency Initiative.¹³ Furthermore, civil society continues to advocate that the Korean government solve the problem of aid fragmentation in accordance with the recommendation of the Peer Review, by consolidating its various tied- and untied- aid agencies under one single organization.¹⁴

11 The involvement of foreign companies in development projects, normally practiced by all aid donor countries, has led to several high profile scandals in the case of Korea, notably in 2012 in Cameroun, where the selection of the African country as a Priority Partner Country was linked to share-rigging in a diamond mining operation linked to Korean business interests.

12 "OECD DAC Review Framework and Korea's Improvements," *June World Economy Update*. (2012). Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

13 This advocacy was done through several social media channels, garnering press coverage as evidenced in the following story: "The Government Must Become a Signatory to the IATI" <http://m.mt.co.kr/new/view.html?no=2013082614268278136> (Accessed October 10, 2013).

14 "The OECD DAC Peer Review and Lessons for Korea's International Development Cooperation," *ODA Watch Letter*, No. 75. (2013) ODA Watch.

Despite stated willingness by government actors to act on certain provisions for improving the quality of Korea aid, existing tensions among agencies have inhibited comprehensive and deep-reaching reforms for more efficient aid.¹⁵

There are still other limitations to Korean aid which touch directly on Korea's knowledge-sharing initiatives, possible solutions to which could give direction, not just to Korea, but to other emerging donors with similar aid architecture and orientations. Development experience-based aid programs are susceptible to politicization and monopoly by the state of a contested past, as well as being prone to adopting an overly narrow economic view of development, which may limit an otherwise rich repertoire of development lessons.

Politicizing the Past

Korea's knowledge sharing initiatives are bearing the ill effects of the monopoly that the Korean state holds over interpreting and re-producing the Korean development experience. Given the continued political significance of certain historical policies and given the serious fragmentation problem of Korean aid, this means that not only is serious doubt placed on the idea of a single unified "Korean model" or a single "Korean experience," but formulating development policy based on aspects of Korean development can be highly politicized, and may in turn suppress any new innovative interpretations of how Korea developed.

The clearest example of how knowledge sharing can be politicized in Korea is the *Saemaeul Undong*, or New Village Movement. The New Village Movement was an integrated rural development movement initiated by Korean strongman Park Chung-Hee's government in the early 1970s. Through state subsidies of agricultural production and heavy investment in rural infrastructure, the movement sought to close the rural-urban gap by having rural people take an active role in building their communities.¹⁶ However, this model of rural development has also been criticized for its totalitarian nature; Park also used the movement as a method of control to solidify the country's military dictator-

15 Tae-Ju Lee, "Stop Agency Compartmentalization for Foreign Aid," *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 04/10/2013. <http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201304102159495&code=990304> (Accessed October 10, 2013).

16 Mick Moore, "Mobilization and Disillusion in Rural Korea: The Saemaul Movement in Retrospect," *Pacific Affairs* 57 No. 4 (1984).

ship and tighten Korea's Republican Party's influence, effectively making the New Village Movement an extension of authoritarian power.^{17/18}

This history makes trying to export the New Village Movement program to other countries a singularly political affair. Since the election of Park Chung-Hee's daughter Park Geun-Hye to the presidency last year, the Korean executive branch has been promoting the use of Saemaul Undong as an aid program by encouraging its aid agencies to boost spending for similar rural development programs¹⁹ and by engaging the UN to incorporate New Village-like activities in its development policies.²⁰

Yet within Korea there has been much opposition to the state's interpretation of the New Village Movement and to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance's designation of the movement as a "successful case."²¹ The very diagnosis of the movement's success is effectuated very differently by the Korean government and by civil society organizations. On one hand, the government identifies three basic success factors in the movement: the state's ability to supply villages with raw materials (such as cement), the competitiveness among villages which lead to more efficient work, and the spirit of cooperation within villages that made community cohesion possible.²² These factors can be applied, according to the government, in developing countries which are experiencing rural poverty and where the state is able to generate the above three factors.

On the other hand, analyses to come out of civil society and some academia present an alternative view and alternative lessons from the experience of the New Village Movement. In many instances the importance of the coordinating role of the government is put forward. During the 1970s, it is argued, rural

17 Youngmi Kim, *Geudeurui Saemaurundong*, (Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa, 2009); Sang Mi Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present," *The Journal of Korean Studies* 15 (2010).

18 Ibid.

19 This very recent expansion in New Village Movement operations overseas has not yet made the subject of any clear strategic position paper by Korea's development actors. It has however made the object of working plans to expand the budget to New Village Movement programs in certain countries, namely in Rwanda and Nepal. A May 2013 conversation between the author and KOICA Rwanda's Deputy Representative has confirmed that the country office is currently working to expand the scale of village-based rural development interventions in direct response to the new Korean administration's stated interest in New Village Movement development projects abroad.

20 President Park's engagement of the United Nations, namely through official meetings with the (Korean national) U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, has made echoes in the Korean press and in popular commentary.

21 Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management, "Modularization of Korea's Development Experience: The Successful Case of the Korea's Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement)" (2011).

22 Ibid.

incomes were boosted mainly through state subsidies of both domestic agricultural supply and demand.²³ The lessons to be taken from this point underline the state's role in market coordination, and involve state-centered policy recommendations for developing countries which are less emphasized or even omitted from the Korean state apparatus' own analyses.

Still more scholars and non-governmental organizations have made the claim that the renewed push to expand Korea's New Village Movement programs overseas is more heavily informed by political and diplomatic considerations than by country needs analyses and diagnoses.²⁴ The state, as both the formulator of national development policy and the main source of funding for Korean aid programs abroad, naturally defines and directs the content and elaboration of its programs. However, it is not clear that the state's interpretation of the New Village Movement is intrinsically more valid than competing interpretations from civil society or academia. Furthermore, doubt can be cast on the very legitimacy of a model of development which prioritizes diplomatic and political considerations above questions of development effectiveness.

But even within the state there are differences in vision and policy which contribute to muddling attempts at constructing a unified 'model' of development. Korea's aid is highly fragmented, with more than 30 different government bodies involved in international development aid.²⁵ The multitude of actors can create a dissonance that belies the state's desire to construct holistic and government-wide models. The example of the Saemaul movement applied here as well: no fewer than five government entities actively participate in funding and implementing Saemaul movement activities in developing countries.

While there have been several attempts to consolidate Saemaul programs and other Korean-experience-based initiatives into coherent models,²⁶ they have all stalled. The policy papers emerging from Korea's aid agencies on the New Village Movement propose a slew of contradictory guiding principles (running the gamut from participatory development-centered²⁷ to centralized and state-

23 Youngmi Kim, *Geudeurui Saemaerundong*, (Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa, 2009).

24 Jae-hyun Noh, "The New New Village Movement" *Korea Joongang Daily*, July 11, 2013, Accessed August 2, 2013. <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2974344>.

25 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development "Peer Review: Korea" Development Assistance Committee (2012).

26 Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Korea, "New Village Movement Official Development Assistance Program: Basic Plan," (2011).

27 Korea International Cooperation Agency, "The Future of Rural Community Development: ODA Policies for Korea's New Village Movement and Implications for Forging Program Strategies," *Development Cooperation Policies and Issues* 11 (2013).

driven.²⁸ There now exist multiple New Village Movement ‘models’, each differing according to the implementing agency: the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the government of Kyungsang Province, and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries are all directly involved with “New Village” activities, each activity equally different in conception as in implementation.

Absent from the Debate: Civil Society

Korea’s state control over experience-based development policy and its severe aid fragmentation show how problematic it is to consolidate a single model for export in the context of development cooperation. The absence of a single model does not mean that effective knowledge sharing is impossible, as long as the void is filled with a constructive, cross-cutting social dialogue that seeks to bring out the nuances of Korea’s past and ongoing development.

The interpretation of any country’s past carries important political implications for its present; the government’s formulation of policy for development cooperation with foreign states becomes *de facto* an issue of domestic policy. Given a history of rapid industrialization and economic growth under authoritarian rule like Korea’s, it could be expected that social movements and civil society actively voice any disagreements in content and interpretation of said development policies, especially should this development cooperation purport to revive old authoritarian-era economic policies.

However, while the Korean government is advancing an agenda for experience-based knowledge sharing on theoretical and implementation fronts, Korean civil society and especially Korean development NGOs are not making their presence felt on either front. The relative silence of civil society on development knowledge sharing has several causes. Firstly, there are few Korean NGOs which actively monitor and engage with Korea’s development policy (the main ones being ODA Watch, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy’s International Cooperation Committee and the umbrella organization for Korean development NGOs, the Korean Civil Society Forum for International Development). This translates in practice to fewer policy papers and smaller, less diversified civil society representation at multi-party events and panels: in short, lower visibility and impact.

Secondly, there is as of yet little connectivity between domestic, development policy- focused Korean NGOs and their counterparts which directly

28 Jeong-gi Whan et. al, “Research on Rural Development Experience Knowledge Transfer to Developing Countries,” Korea International Cooperation Agency, (2008).

implement and supervise programs in developing countries. This means that civil society contestations of the Korean state's development policies are not necessarily linked to evidence from Korean development NGOs overseas. For example, the Korean NGO Good Neighbors International is engaged in implementing community development projects abroad, purportedly based on Korean rural development, and funded by KOICA.²⁹ However no discursive or policy production (events, co-written papers, public debates) have linked Good Neighbors' work, the successes and/or failures of the project, back to the critiques made to the New Village movement model by domestic Korean NGOs.

Lastly, there exists an important gap in connectivity between civil society organizations working on domestic development issues and development NGOs. A country's development experience can be accessed and analyzed through a number of intermediaries (including state ministries and foreign aid organizations), but civil society is one of the few alternative, non-state sources of "development history".³⁰ They are well placed to put forward an alternative, nonofficial story on the effects of state development policies. These organizations include trade unions, business cooperatives, government oversight groups and more. However, these organizations' interaction with domestic development NGOs to produce a broader contestation of the state's discourse of development cooperation is very restricted in Korea. Instead, development NGOs are much more active in building alliances with international civil society and have developed tight ties with certain state development apparatus (as evidenced by the regular appearances of development NGO papers in KOICA publications, namely International Development Cooperation).

These three points all drive home the absence of any prolific contestation of the state's analysis of Korea's development history. While there are certain examples of Korean NGOs and think tanks putting forward alternative versions of Korean development and alternative policy recommendations³¹ these are few in number. The state still very much holds a monopoly on policy implementation and discourse surrounding Korea's development experience.

29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. "Press Release: Korea-WFP 'Food for New Village' Project Cooperation" 31 May 2011.

30 Wiebe W. Nauta, "Democratic Deepening in South Korea and South Africa in an Age of Global Rebalancing: The Potential Role of Civil Society in the Era of Internet," in *Globalization and Development in East Asia*, ed. Jan N. Pieterse and Jongtae Kim (New York: Routledge, 2012), 182.

31 "'Address the voice of the 99 percent': Rio+20 Interview with Jaehyun Jang, Programme Specialist, Reshaping Development Institute, Republic of Korea" World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS), Accessed August 22, 2013, <https://civicus.org/en/what-we-do/cross-cutting-projects/rio-20/civicus-on-rio-20/907-address-the-voice-of-the-99-rio20-interview-with-jaehyun-jang-programme-specialist-reshaping-development-institute-republic-of-korea>.

A Narrow Vision of Development

Furthermore the idea of a Korean model of development, as well as the packaging of that model, has confined itself to a narrow, mostly economic interpretation of development. Korea's astounding rise from abject poverty to the world's thirteenth economy certainly does have relevant policy lessons to give in terms of economic development.

But the Korean example is also germane in many other fields, which are very important to the development of a country. An examination of the most coherent effort to map Korea's development history and lessons for other countries, the KSP Modularization work, demonstrates this lack of thematic diversity. Topics close to industrialization and economic development abound (public works construction, tax code reform, productivity improvement). Yet there are some key themes that are not at all touched on by the project, such as organized labor and the press. It is nevertheless worth noting that certain social development themes are featured, albeit not prominently, in the publications. These include welfare policy³² and environmental conservation.³³ The project privileges themes close to the state and close to economic development.

Yet Korea has not just seen gains in its GDP since 1960. Growth was accompanied, at different stages, with labor movements, freedom of the press initiatives and many other social advancements; how did this progress come about? What was the relationship between, for example, industrialization and environmental conservation? What factors fostered the meteoric growth of civil society organizations in the period just after democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and what effect did this have on Korea society? All these questions are vital to a holistic understanding of how Korea enacted such a rapid social and economic change in so little time.

These questions are also central to addressing the possibility for a more holistic approach to the Korean development experience by Korean aid actors. In certain cases, the overt focus on a single dimension of the Korean experience can shroud larger development-related considerations. This is the case of Korea's 'Green ODA' initiative, attempting in part to bring forth Korea's lessons in environmental conservation during its period of industrial development.

Under the name of 'Green ODA', Korea has engaged in dam construction projects, including the on-going Karian reservoir Project in Indonesia. The

32 Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management, "Modularization of Korea's Development Experience: The Operation of Nationwide Health Insurance and its Implications" (2011).

33 Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management, "Modularization of Korea's Development Experience: The Operation of the Environmental Charging System in Korea" (2012).

project in question has involved the forced expulsion and resettlement of over 3,000 households from the area.³⁴ While it may succeed in its primary goal of providing both steady water and energy supplies to the country, it remains unclear that the forced relocations have benefited the population in the immediate surrounding area. The project in question could perhaps have benefited from mobilizing other aspects of the Korean experience, including an understanding of the evolution of property rights law during the 1970s in Korea, when cases of eminent domain contrasted landowner's rights with the state's industrial development projects. Other aspects of the Korean experience could be brought forward to minimize negative externalities.

These questions are also equally important to understanding the effects of economic policies in broader society. There is a noticeable gap in the empirical literature on Korean economic development, as most of it skirts around or does not lend serious weight to intrinsically social impacts of economic phenomena. This is very valuable to developing countries today, which are increasingly looking beyond simple prescriptions for growth and towards mechanisms to lower social risk, redistribute wealth and build up resiliency.³⁵

Conclusion-Policy Recommendations

In summary Korea's development experience, despite its great promise for developing countries, is not living up to its potential. The following policy recommendations for Korean state development policymakers are put forward based on the identified shortcomings of Korea's knowledge sharing for development.

Firstly, Korea must show the value added that its development history brings to the makeup of international development cooperation. In a post-financial crisis world, where contestations of financial liberalization as well as neoclassical economic principles are gaining in popularity,³⁶ this means making the bold move of promoting the heterodox economic stances and principles (especially with regards to industrial policy) which contributed in such large part to the country's success.^{37/38} In a recent article, economist Dani Rodrik empha-

34 "S. Korea Provides 100 million US Dollars for Karian Reservoir Project," *Antara News*, 28.01.2011. Accessed 10.10.2013. <http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/67419/s-korea-provides-100-million-us-dollars-for-karian-reservoir-project>

35 United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Development Policy, "Social Protection, Growth and Employment: Evidence from India, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico and Tajikistan" (2013).

36 Mark Blyth, "The Austerity Delusion: Why a Bad Idea Won over the West," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2013.

37 Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 4964*, (1994).

38 Ha-Joon Chang, "The Political Economy of Industrial policy in Korea," *Cambridge Journal of Eco-*

sized this point as a key value added in the development cooperation policies of emerging donors:

“Their own development experience makes countries like China, India, and Brazil resistant to market fundamentalism and natural advocates for institutional diversity and pragmatic experimentation. They can build on this experience to articulate a new global narrative that emphasizes the real economy over finance, policy diversity over harmonization, national policy space over external constraints and social inclusion over technocratic elitism.”³⁹

Secondly, Korea must work towards and open and pragmatic methods for interpreting the past. It must shy away from preferring political and national strategic interests to development effectiveness. This also means opening up to a national discussion on its development history, fostering dialogue where it is lacking among civil society organizations and enabling non-state organizations to collaborate and bring forward different, competing interpretations and actualizations (through implementation in the field) of the Korean development experience. The government needs to be pragmatic in this approach, ready to change up old toolboxes and methodologies, but also willing to call into question the development paradigms within which it is working.

Together with these measures, NGOs need to increase their presence in debates and play a larger role, not just in bringing constructive critiques to existing frameworks, but in shaping future aid policy. In order to involve a broader swath of civil society in the aid debate, existing umbrella organizations such as the Korean Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation (KoFID) must frame its policy debates, advocacy efforts and academic research in a way that can appeal to various other types of domestic civil society organizations. One possible unexplored avenue for this kind of cooperation is the linkage between migrant workers in Korea and Korean-led development efforts in the workers’ home countries. Expanding the actors present in these debates will bring a more holistic interpretation of Korean experiences to bear on development policy.

nomics 17 (1993): 131-157.

39 Dani Rodrik, “What the World Needs from the BRICS,” *Project Syndicate*, April 10, 2013. Accessed 20 August, 2013. <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-brics-and-global-economic-leadership-by-dani-rodrik>.

Lastly, Korea stands to make a stronger contribution to international development cooperation if it challenges the boundaries of where and how its development history can be applied. Beyond economic policy, there is a trove of lessons regarding the development of Korean society, in success and failure, which respond to new needs and interests of developing countries. This recommendation aligns well with the previous one: it is only by engaging a broad cross-section of society on the question of Korea's past development that various social issues can be brought to light.

These policy recommendations are formulated based on the Korean example, but the underlying idea that a country's development experience needs to be analyzed and interpreted in a holistic manner, thinking beyond the state when necessary, applies to all emerging donors. Countries such as Brazil, Turkey, Japan, China, South Africa and others have real contributions to make to the international community, and must shape their development cooperation policies accordingly. Knowledge sharing for development must not be a single-minded drive to define and operationalize the past, but a whole-of-society approach to explore and share its nuances and contingencies. Y

WHY HAS THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU DISPUTE BEEN INTENSIFIED AND WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS?

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The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is a territorial conflict between China and Japan, and there have been ups and downs over several decades. As China's assertiveness has been increased from the late 2000s, much attention has been paid to the relationship between China and Japan. The issue is related with each state's strategic, economic and symbolic interests, which makes the nature of the dispute complex. In this paper, it is argued that the growing tension between China and Japan is largely influenced by the changing international structure due to the rise of China, and the issue is reinforced by domestic politics as the politicians could utilize the issue as a political tool to gain public support based upon strong nationalism in China and Japan. There are three options available to resolve the conflict: military confrontation, the US intervention, and the international legal institution. These options will be critiqued with a meaningful analysis, and the paper suggests that a long-term resolution should be adopted by emphasizing the importance of public education and cooperative measures to develop the area for both states' benefits after recovering mutual trust.

Introduction

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute is a territorial conflict between China and Japan over a group of islands in the East China Sea, and it has strained the Sino-Japanese relationship for several decades. The nature of the issue is greatly complex due to the combination of each state's strategic, economic and symbolic interests. Historically, the dispute originated from the period of imperial Japan in 1885 when Japan occupied the Islands in pursuit of its empire in the region. After WWII, from Japan's perspective, under the San Francisco Treaty in 1952 the Senkaku Islands belonged to the US as part of the Nansei

Shoto Islands (Okinawa); however, from China's side, the Islands were returned with Taiwan at the time. Thus, the turning point was 1971 when Okinawa was returned from the US to Japan. Since then, the tensions have grown between the two states, and there is a pattern that one of the states challenges the other especially when there is a physical clash, and the dispute periodically escalates and de-escalates. Nonetheless, the point where the states lose control over the dispute has not been reached.

The conflict has shown ups and downs, but the level of intensity has been growing from the late 2000s. To account for this intensified tension, there are various approaches to the conflict in international relations. Realism pays attention to the power dynamics between China and Japan, and constructivism emphasizes the importance of the historical legacies and symbolic meaning of acquiring the islands as strong nationalism is present in Northeast Asia. Though liberalists could not specifically account for the increasing tension over the region in recent years, they contend that military confrontations are unlikely due to increasing economic interdependence. Among numerous factors, I argue that the growing tension between China and Japan is largely influenced by the changing international structure due to the rise of China and it is reinforced by domestic politics as the politicians could utilize the issue as a political tool to gain public support based upon strong nationalism in China and Japan.

To support my argument, first, I present the literature review and the background of the issue. Second, to assess China's increasing aggressiveness, I analyze its behavior during the 2000s considering three aspects: military capabilities, diplomatic stance and administrative activities. In particular, I pay attention to the 2010 incident to present the case of China's assertive attitude. Third, I study the international structure of Northeast Asia to find the main cause of the intensification of the conflict, and I point out that China as a revisionist challenges the status quo which has been supported by Japan. As China's interests are expanding, its approach is expressed through increasing military capabilities and aggressive diplomatic stance. In response, Japan strongly resists against such attempt to secure the status quo.

Next, I examine several options for possible resolutions: military confrontation, the US intervention, and the international legal institution. After I critique these options, in conclusion I claim that a long-term resolution should be adopted by emphasizing the importance of public education and cooperative measures to develop the area for both states' benefits. Both states should recover mutual trust first, and the people need to recognize the possible benefits of a close and friendly relationship. Hence, the government and politicians would be constrained from intensifying the issue for political purposes.

Background of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute

Understanding the historical background of the dispute is critical because both countries' claims are based on both historical and legal accounts. Since there is no consensus on the origin of the ownership, each state assertively insists on its own claim. The origin of the dispute dates back to the late nineteenth century when Japan exerted its imperial power in the region. According to Japan, with the conduct of ten years of survey it established its sovereignty over the islands after determining that the islands are uninhabited.¹ On the contrary, China argues that from ancient times the islands were under China's ownership, and have been under Taiwan's provincial administration. The Chinese argue that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were subject to Japanese rule after China's defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war, given that China ceded Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki.²

After WWII, Japan signed the San Francisco Treaty in 1952, and according to the Chinese government, the Islands were returned with Taiwan to China. Nevertheless, Japan asserts that the islands were not included in the territory that Japan renounced under Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which legally defined Japan's postwar territory. Under the treaty, the Senkaku Islands were placed under US administration as part of Okinawa (in accordance with Article III).³

The turning point of the dispute was 1971 when Japan obtained its ownership over Okinawa in accordance with the Agreement between Japan and the United States concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed on 17 June 1971. Japan viewed that the Islands were part of the Ryukyu Islands so that from Japan's perspective, it regained its jurisdiction over the Islands from the US. Since the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule in 1972, the Japanese government has constantly sent its naval forces, called Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), to eject Chinese fishermen from this area. Moreover, in 1972, Japan challenged Taiwan government's planning for oil development, which caused massive Taiwanese protests.

Nevertheless, the dispute between Taiwan and Japan turned into a conflict between mainland China and Japan due to the normalization of the two states

1 "Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, November 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/fact_sheet.html (accessed May 20, 2013).

2 "China Makes Solemn Representations to Japan over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, February 11, 2009, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjfb/zjzg/yzs/xwlb/t536836.shtml> (accessed May 15, 2013).

3 "Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands."

in 1972, and Japan began to derecognize Taiwan. Later in October 1978, while China and Japan were about to reach a formal treaty, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the islands dispute again emerged to disturb the bilateral relationship. In Japan, a group of politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) contended to ensure the islands dispute with China from reaching the agreement by raising the issue in the Diet. The Chinese in response furiously protested against the Japanese account, and a flotilla of fishing boats from China reached the islands. However, Deng Xiaoping, then Vice Premier, proclaimed that both governments had agreed to shelve the issue in 1972 and suggested to postpone resolving the issue:

“It is true that the two sides maintain different views on this question.... It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all.”⁴

Since then, the conflict has had ups and downs and sometimes constrained the diplomatic relations between China and Japan. During the 1990s, more conflicts occurred between the two states. For example, in 1992, China asserted its claim by passing the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which explicitly specifies the “Diaoyu Islands” as China’s territory, whereas the Japanese in June 1996 declared an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (taking effect on July 20, 1996). Further, physical clashes between the Japanese and Chinese ships were increasing, but both states did not devise suitable means to solve the issue.

In the 2000s, the frequency of escalations has increased and especially so in the late 2000s. In January 2004, there was a clash between two Chinese fishing vessels and patrol boats of the Japanese MSDF.⁵ In March 2004, for the first time seven activists from mainland China landed on the islands and were subsequently arrested by Japanese security forces. Such conduct led Japan to officially protest against China, but China expressed both concern and criticism over the arrests. In April 2004, a member of a Japanese right-wing group rammed a bus into the Chinese consulate in Osaka in western Japan to protest

4 Deng Xiaoping, quoted in Chi-kin Lo, *China’s Policy toward Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands* (London: Routledge, 1989), 171-72.

5 “Japanese warships attack Chinese fishing boats off Diaoyu Island,” *Xinhua News Agency*, January 14, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-01/15/content_1278205.htm (accessed May 22, 2013).

China's claims, which caused further massive protests by the Chinese government and people. Furthermore, in February 2005, Japan announced that it had placed under state control and protection a lighthouse erected on the largest of the Senkaku Islands by Japanese right-wing activists in 1988. In July 2004, both China and Japan had a conflict regarding exploring resources. Japan explored in its self-alleged EEZ to counter China's gas construction, but China disputed against Japan's action as both countries had not agreed upon the delimitation of the area. As shown, the disputes in the 2000s were largely due to both states' disagreement on each state's way to consolidate one's territorial claim. In the late 2000s, however, China's aggressiveness was much more apparent, which will be dealt with in the following section.

Literature Review

The Senkaku conflict has been explained with diverse approaches in the field of international relations. First, according to the realist view, in Northeast Asia, the power structure cannot be addressed without the US as a hegemonic power. Realists have paid close attention to the role of the US in the region and the alliance between Japan and the US. Though the US holds a neutral stance on the issue, it is still important to view the issue in consideration of the US factor. Scholars point out that the US presence and its strong alliance with Japan in the region has kept Japan from direct confrontation with China.⁶ However, since the rise of China was actively discussed due to China's economic growth and increasing military capabilities, the uncertainties about the issue were essential. Thus, from a realist's view, the islands dispute can be explained with a view to the changing power structure, and it is the competition between China and Japan over the islands.

Second, liberals emphasize the regime type, economic interdependence, and international organizations. To analyze the dispute, liberals pay attention to economic relations between Japan and China and anticipate that both countries would not ignore the benefits from bilateral relations to acquire the islands by showing the increasing amount of bilateral trade, investment, and finance.⁷ They

6 See: Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "The US Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands 1945-1941," *China Quarterly* 161, (2000): 95-123; Kimie Hara, "50 years from San Francisco: re-examining the peace treaty and Japan's territorial problems," *Pacific Affairs* 74, no. 3 (2001): 361-82; J. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing theories of Japanese security policy," *International Security* 29, no.1 (2004), 92-121.

7 See: Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage* (New York: Putnam, 2010); Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Min Gyo Koo, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: cold politics

argue that due to growing economic interdependence, both states would not risk military confrontation over the Islands. However, liberalism could not explain that the conflict has intensified despite increasing economic ties. According to liberalism, for both countries, it is more beneficial to cooperate in order to obtain economic gains through common research to exert possible resources under the Islands, but this seems unlikely between China and Japan.

Third, constructivists' explanation may be helpful to understand Northeast Asian international relations. The islands dispute is explained by both countries' historical and cultural backgrounds which are critical components to understand the relations between China and Japan. The constructivist viewpoint is especially valuable to explain the area which realists and liberals cannot explain. Since national identity and pride are strong in Northeast Asia, the massive protests are driven by historical legacies and nationalism. In addition, the dispute also can be explained with China's growing irredentist tendency combined with Japan's habit of glossing over its war past.⁸ From this view, legal approaches are possible if they are changing the perspectives on the issue. Hence, this approach predicts that the dispute would likely continue and escalate, as long as both material and symbolic, as well as legal and historical, issues remain unresolved.⁹

Lastly, domestic politics explanation links the dispute and government leadership which utilizes the issue to mobilize political support. Scholars focusing on this approach study the timing and manner of actions of domestic actors.¹⁰ It is assumed that politicians defend and enhance domestic legitimacy and public support for their regime or particular policy. This explanation is relatively compelling for this dispute because in both states, anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiments are often utilized to mobilize public support.

China's increasing assertiveness

To assess China's increasing aggressiveness, three aspects can be considered: China's diplomatic stance via official statements, China's increasing military capabilities, and China's ambition to engage in patrol activities around the islands. First, as noted above, there have been physical clashes between the two

and hot economics?," *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 2 (2009): 205-232.

8 See: Unryu Suganuma, *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); Shogo Suzuki, "The importance of "othering" in China's national identity: Sino-Japanese relations as a stage of identity conflicts," *The Pacific Review* 20, no. 1 (2007): 23-47.

9 Koo, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations."

10 See: C. Chung, *Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

states since the 1970s. What is significant in this section is how China's diplomatic stance on the incidents has changed over time. In January 2004, there was a physical clash in the sea, and the Chinese government issued a press release stating that Japanese warships had attacked Chinese fishing boats. Though China expressed its sovereignty and ownership over the islands, it did not make further comments to protest against Japan for such action. China did not constrain other aspects of its diplomatic relationship with Japan due to this dispute.

In June 2008, both the Chinese and the Japanese governments announced that both sides had reached a principled consensus on the East China Sea dispute. The consensus contained several key elements: the two sides will conduct cooperation in the transitional period prior to delimitation without prejudicing their legal positions; both sides jointly take the first step to conduct joint development on the northern part of the East China Sea. After this announcement, Chinese vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei stated that progress on relations between China and Japan since 2007 had created the necessary conditions for the two nations to reach consensus and understanding on the East China Sea dispute. In addition, he stated: "some sensitive issues can be easily resolved as bilateral relations improve, and I believe if we can make a breakthrough on the East China Sea issue, we will also be able to address other complex and sensitive issues between the two nations."¹¹

These statements and attitudes from the Chinese government present its willingness to resolve the issue diplomatically and to seek cooperation between the two states. However, the incident in 2010 shows China's increasing diplomatic assertiveness. Unlike prior years, China had applied other measures to link with the territorial issue and to constrain the relationship with Japan. China postponed a scheduled Japan-China parliamentary Exchange (September 13, 2010) and used trade as a strategic means to threaten Japan. China stated that "China has warned Japan that their wider relationship will suffer if Tokyo mishandles a dispute about a Chinese fishing boat seized in disputed waters." It specifically warned that the territorial issue can be extended to other diplomatic relations with Japan.¹² Lastly, China postponed a visit of 1,000 Japanese youths to the Expo 2010 in Shanghai (September 19, 2010).¹³ Before this inci-

11 "Chinese Vice FM: Progress on Sino-Japanese relations creates conditions to resolve East China Sea issue," June 19, 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/international/foreign_ministry/2008-06/20/content_15861719.htm (accessed June 1, 2013).

12 "Japan-China boat spat escalates," *BBC News*, September 9, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11241445> (accessed May 30, 2013).

13 "Recent Developments in Japan-China Relations," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, October 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pdfs/facts1010.pdf> (accessed May 29, 2013).

dent, China had shown its willingness to seek cooperation, but this incident has demonstrated China's assertive attitude to secure its interests at the expense of further constrained relations with Japan.

Second, China has shown its increasing military capabilities in the region. Its naval modernization has concerned not only neighboring countries but also the US. China's military modernization includes a so-called anti access force—a force that “can deter US intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening US naval and air forces.”¹⁴ In recent years, observers have argued that not only Taiwan but China's naval modernization effort is increasingly related with pursuing additional goals such as: asserting or defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China's view—a minority but growing view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime EEZ; protecting China's sea lines of communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing US influence in the Pacific; and asserting China's status as a major world power.¹⁵

It is argued that China's military modernization started in the 1990s by acquiring a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China's naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises.¹⁶ Therefore, it is China's internal balancing which ensures security through increasing its military capabilities in case of a direct military confrontation with Japan. This does not mean that China and Japan would adopt a military measure. However, based upon a defensive strategy China prepares militarily for a worst case scenario.

Third, along with the increasing military capabilities, China has expanded its role in surveillance and patrol activities by challenging the administrative status quo in the East China Sea through sending vessels to the area. Since the mid-2000s, there have been efforts to emphasize maritime security in China. For example, in August 2004, the national work meeting on construction of border and coastal defense infrastructure was held in Beijing.¹⁷ Furthermore,

14 Ronald O'Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, April 26, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>.

15 *Ibid.*, 2.

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*, 33.

in December 2008, for the first time Chinese Government vessels intruded into Japan's territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, which reportedly raised concern among the Japanese public. The Japanese government claimed that these actions contributed to public support for a plan to purchase the Senkaku Islands by the former Tokyo Governor, Shintaro Ishihara.¹⁸ Moreover, although lightly armed or unarmed, Chinese maritime vessels are often coupled with People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) capabilities over the horizon. By using "non-military" vessels to engage in military coercion, China is increasing the likelihood of escalation as well as the speed with which it could occur. At the same time, the increased activity and assertiveness of Chinese maritime vessels are ultimately provoking military responses from regional powers to repel and deter Chinese incursions—which contradicts Chinese arguments that these forces serve to keep military forces at bay.¹⁹

Incident in 2010

Physical clashes between Japan and China around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are not rare, but what is striking about the incident in 2010 is China's aggressiveness and strong determination to display its interests related to the Islands. On September 7, 2010, there were collisions between two Japanese patrol boats and a Chinese trawler. According to the Japanese Coast Guard spokesman, the Chinese vessel had collided with two Japanese patrol boats in two separate incidents. Despite repeated warnings from the Japanese guards, the Chinese ship remained in the area so that the Chinese captain of the fishing boat finally was arrested by the Japanese authority. In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman repeated China's claim on the Diaoyu islands and urged Japanese patrol boats in the area against conducting any "so-called law enforcement activities or any actions that would jeopardize Chinese fishing boats or Chinese people."²⁰

Further, China warned Japan that their wider relationship will suffer if Tokyo mishandles a dispute about the Chinese fishing boat seized in disputed waters. China's foreign ministry said it was "absurd and illegal" for Japan to apply do-

18 "Recent Developments in Japan-China Relations."

19 "The Challenge of Chinese Revisionism: The Expanding Role of China's Non-Military Maritime Vessels," *Center for New American Security*, February 1, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Bulletin_HosfordRatner_ChineseRevisionism.pdf.

20 "Boat Collisions Spark Japan-China Diplomatic Row," *BBC News*, September 8, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11225522> (accessed May 23, 2013).

mestic law in “China’s territory.”²¹ China expressed its concern and complained against Japan not only through official statements but also exerted its influence over other areas affecting the bilateral relationship. China canceled officials’ visit to Japan and blocked exports to Japan of a crucial category of minerals used in products like hybrid cars, wind turbines and guided missiles—so-called rare earth elements. A spokesman for the Chinese commerce ministry declined to discuss the country’s trade policy on rare earths, and China denied Japan’s complaints that China related the diplomatic conflict to trade.²² At the moment, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao personally called for Japan’s release of the captain, and Mr. Wen threatened unspecified further actions if Japan did not comply.²³

The Intensity of the Conflict and China’s Increasing Assertiveness

The 2010 incident in particular presents that China has expressed its strong interests in the Islands with an increasingly assertive attitude. It is not surprising to see that China claims its ownership over the Islands; however, the growing diplomatic, political and even military tension is remarkable in the late 2000s. This paper attributes these factors of the escalation of to the rising China and its expanded core interests as it challenges the administrative status quo preferred by Japan with its effective control of the region. Further, it argues that domestic politics in both states reinforce the intensity of the conflict as the politicians could utilize the issue as a political tool to gain public support based upon strong nationalism in China and Japan.

From the literature review, there are several factors to account for within the conflict. To grasp the increasing intensity of the conflict, the realist perspective is relevant because the rise of China has been changing the structure of the international order in Northeast Asia. Because of the presence of the US, direct confrontations between China and Japan over the Islands have been constrained; however, the rise of China has brought uncertainties to the international structure of Northeast Asia, and this power dynamics is shown in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. Though China has been interested in the region for strategic purposes for long, it is more likely that its increasing military and economic capabilities in recent years have supported China’s decision to challenge Japan.

21 “Japan-China Boat Spat Escalates.”

22 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Crucial Exports to Japan,” *New York Times*, September 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/global/24rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed May 23, 2013).

23 Ibid.

In addition, defensive realism is helpful to explain both states' behavior. Unlike offensive realism which emphasizes a state's power maximization,²⁴ defensive realists hold that states are largely concerned with their own survival and security, which could include seeking power. Accordingly, Stephen Walt argues that a state will assess how threatening a potential adversary is based on a combination of factors including geography and intentions as well as capabilities.²⁵ Thus, compared to offensive realism, a state's behavior is largely determined by its interpretation of the other state's intention. When a state views the other state's intention as malign, it would behave in a manner consistent with offensive realism. If intentions are viewed as benign, then a state is likely to respond defensively by maintaining a balance of power and even adopting a defensive military posture and eschewing offensive military capabilities. If mutual perceptions of intentions are benign, then security cooperation rather than competition becomes possible.

Regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku conflict, offensive realism may not be easily applicable because the conflict is not simply the result of China's and Japan's power maximization in the region. Instead, a careful analysis of both states' intention and security concern in the changing international structure is needed. From the Chinese side, as it is rising in the region, it implies that China's interests are expanding in both economic and militarily aspects. Concerned with securing its interests, China aims for increased control over Northeast Asia where the US is the hegemony and Japan has maintained a strong alliance with the US. While the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are included in China's interests due to its strategic and economic incentives, in China's view on Japan considering its capabilities and intention, consensus would unlikely be obtained. Hence, this increasing intensity of the territorial conflict reflects rising China's challenge against the status quo maintained by Japan in competition for power in the region. Further, though China is regarded as an initiator in this conflict, it is critical to note that Japan strongly resists against China's challenge. Among four options, balancing, buck-passing, accommodation, and appeasement, Japan chooses to balance against China's influence to maintain its status quo.

In addition, both states' domestic politics is related with this territorial dispute. For the Chinese government, with rapid economic growth and mounting middle class, the expectations from the public are increasing. According to democracy theorists, the public requires more from the government for the better

24 See: John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

25 See: Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998): 29-45.

life which includes more political and civil rights, and it is more likely that people are dissatisfied with the authoritarian government. To maintain social stability, relieve discontent against the government, obtain public support, and ensure the CCP's legitimacy, Beijing often utilizes nationalism. In Japan, the rightist politicians in the LDP also encourage the nationalist substance and anti-Chinese sentiment to mobilize public support for its political purposes. This tendency in both states reinforces the intensity of the conflict. Due to the adverse historical legacies between China and Japan, it is useful for both countries to mobilize public support for its regime or a particular policy. Thus, the rise of China and strong nationalism in Northeast Asia contribute to the recent intensification of the territorial conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Possible Resolutions

In this section, I assess possible options for the resolution for the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. The resolutions are analyzed based upon the causes of the incident pointed out in the previous section. I view each government as a main actor in this issue. Though the public opinion is critical for the escalation of the conflict, I assume that the public opinion is dependent upon the state's reaction and decision to politicize the issue. For example, if both governments keep low diplomacy over the incident, it is not reported in the media through which people are mainly exposed to the incidents. Considering the significant role of the states in the dispute, possible options for resolving the international conflicts are evaluated. According to this analysis, there are three options: military confrontation, third state's intervention, and resolution through legal means.

First, the military option is available for China and Japan to solve the dispute. A military confrontation means that the two countries go to war to acquire each state's national interest over the islands. However, considering economic interdependence and the US presence, solution through military means is unlikely. Both countries are heavily interdependent as a rapid increase in trade, investment and finance indicates. Thus, despite negative mutual sentiments, it is too costly for both states to adopt a military option. Further, China requires both internal and external stability for its economic growth, which is a critical task for the government to preserve its regime. From the Japanese perspective, the US would not approve Japan's involvement in a war over the Islands. The US has kept its neutral stance, and called for cooperation in the region to create a more peaceful environment. In addition, the extremely low possibility of adopting a military option is shown in the pattern of the territorial conflicts. Both states never reached the point where they could not control the issue any

more. Of course, there have been escalations, and there have been efforts to strengthen military capabilities especially by China. However, a direct military confrontation between China and Japan is not plausible.

Second, a US intervention could be possible for resolving the issue since both states insist on their respective claims. As the US is the dominant power in the region, it is possible that the US could promote peaceful resolution for the territorial dispute. Nonetheless, there are several factors making the US intervention unlikely for the possible resolution. First, the US has not shown its willingness to be involved in the conflict. Due to the US-Japan alliance, Japan could expect more support from the US; however, for regional peace and stability, the US would not take a side with Japan because it goes against the US role in the Pacific region. Second, China would strongly oppose the US engagement in the issue. China has called for no right to intervene in internal affairs and argued that the US has no ground to be involved in the dispute between China and Japan. Thus, any attempt by the US would be severely criticized by China. Lastly, the US has no strong substantial interests in the Islands so that it is unlikely that the US facilitates resolution of the issue but merely calls for both states' cooperation.

Third, this territorial issue could be resolved through legal means. Currently, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is present to deal with maritime disputes. It was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994.²⁶ It defines maritime zones including a territorial sea, a continuous zone, an EEZ, and a continental shelf. When both states address their rights over the Islands, they often use the terms in the UNCLOS. However, the problem is that both states have not even reached consensus on the delimitation of the base lines. Each state prefers a different way. For example, China prefers equidistance line but Japan prefers equitable line to delimitate the area. Further, to file a case to the International Court of Justice, both states have to agree to transfer their rights to the court to make decisions; however, this is unlikely since Japan would not officially recognize this issue as a conflict because it currently effectively controls the region.

Thus, a long-term resolution should be considered for this dispute. The role of intellectuals, elites, and civil society is essential. Though this resolution seems slow and ideal, gradual efforts could change the public's attitude and eventually the government's foreign policy. Hence, public education is essential to raise public awareness of the seriousness of anti-Chinese/Japanese sentiments. Due

26 See: Min Gyo Koo, "Chapter 4: The Island and Maritime Disputes in the East Sea/Sea of Japan," *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia* (New York: Springer, 2009).

to the protests, there have been excessive violent protests harming people and properties. There should be efforts to inform the politicians to be aware of the negative aspects of utilizing nationalism for gaining public support. It seems to work in a short term; however, utilizing nationalism could challenge the government if it could not satisfy the demand from the public. Then, when the atmosphere becomes peaceful by recovering mutual trusts, cooperative measures to develop the area around the islands are plausible.

Conclusion

The Diaoyu/Senkaku issue has been critical for the Sino-Japanese relations as the political, diplomatic, and even economic relations have been constrained. In terms of mutual benefits, closer ties are desirable; however, both states strongly insist on their claims over the Islands. Historically, the issue itself is very complex, because both states' perspectives on the past differ from each other. Japan includes the Islands into Okinawa, but China regards the Islands as part of Taiwan.

There have been ups and downs in the dispute, but recently the intensity of the conflict is apparent due to the rise of China. I have showed China's increasing aggressiveness via three aspects: military modernization, an active involvement in patrolling activities, and diplomatic stance. China has increased its military capabilities and adopted a so-called anti-access forces strategy to secure its growing core interests. Diplomatically, as the 2010 incident presents, China has changed its attitude by threatening Japan. Chinese customs officials even halted shipments to Japan of rare earth elements. Further, starting from 2008, China has tried to actively participate in patrol activities in the area, which concerned not only Japan but also the US.

Hence, the growing tension between China and Japan is largely influenced by the changing international structure due to the rise of China and it is reinforced by domestic politics as the politicians could utilize the issue as a political tool to gain public support based upon strong nationalism in China and Japan. Considering this situation, I have analyzed the possible resolutions such as military confrontation, US intervention, and through legal means, and have pointed out each option's weakness. Thus, a long-term resolution is suggested to develop mutual trust between the two states through public education and cooperative development of the area. **Y**

“LANDSCAPE AS POLITICAL PROJECT”- THE “GREENING” OF NORTH KOREA, SINCERITY OR OTHERWISE? INVESTIGATING THE PROCESS OF IDEOLOGICAL INCORPORATION IN NORTH KOREA

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Environmental management and practical policy strategies relating to it have always been an important part of North Korea’s approach to what would be locally described as “revolutionary” industrial/economic development. However, since the collapse of the wider Soviet Bloc, and the famine period of the mid 1990s, it has been possible to determine a change in policies relating to the management of the natural world in North Korea. Pyongyang’s government and institutions have begun to respond to developing themes within the theory and policy of governments, strategists and theoreticians from the wider world inspired by concepts of “conservation” and “preservation,” derived from environmental or “green” movements. North Korea has sought to incorporate such governmental or strategic themes within its ideology—in ways that do not destabilize its own philosophical or governmental frameworks, but instead serve to strengthen them. Accordingly, projects within North Korea, whose focus is environmental management, have begun to resemble those of the wider world and in the closer East Asian neighborhood, but to what end: environmental rehabilitation or regime survival? This paper builds on previous research identifying historical narratives relating to environmental management within North Korea and the routes through which its institutions translate ideological or philosophical development into practical policy; it investigates the routes through which North Korea incorporates foreign or external ideas within its own theoretical construct—how these ideas and projects spurred by them are utilised for domestic and international propaganda needs. It seeks to evaluate if the sincerity or otherwise of such an incorporation can be established and ultimately whether this would prove useful in the development of analysis focused on construction or translation of theoretical development or institutional functionality within North Korea.

Introduction

Current political, academic, and media narratives surrounding North Korea are focused primarily within three areas of approach. It seems difficult for many scholars to examine North Korea, its politics and policy from outside the paradigms of “unknowability” and opacity, threat or collapse. These narratives have not, however, led to the making of much progress in understanding the nature of North Korea’s policy, political actions or intentions in recent years. From an academic perspective they do not shed much light on the actuality of ideological or policy development within North Korea.

This paper seeks to approach North Korea from a different perspective, that of regarding it as a pragmatic actor in both its internal and external policy. Within it I will briefly introduce the historical environmental strategies of North Korea, with some key examples that track the development of such strategies through the historical narrative from the infant post-Korean War North Korea through Sino/Soviet splits to the era of the “arduous march,” the post-1992 famine and the general collapse of its environmental policy at this time. I will suggest that North Korea has, throughout its history, continually adjusted its environmental strategy not only to reflect its developing ideological formulation but also to accommodate new realities in its geopolitical positioning and any presentational or propaganda needs it might have. Such a strategy has brought the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to its current position in which its environmental strategy revolves around elements of conservation and an awareness of the natural world that derives, it seems, from western/wider world theories surrounding the environment and presents us with a DPRK that claims to be “green,” and strategically undertakes many projects and schemes which seem to be sound from an environmental ethical standpoint. Therefore, finally this paper will seek to investigate the question whether the DPRK understands what it is to be “green” in a conventional way, present some practical examples of how the DPRK’s current environmental position affects both practical policy and institutional functionality and to analyze the veracity, or otherwise, of a “green” Pyongyang.

Historical Environmental Strategies of North Korea

Post-War Initial Capacity/Infrastructural Development

Environmental management within North Korea and analysis surrounding it starts with war. Bruce Cumings, for example, describes the Korean War as hav-

ing left a scorched earth in its wake.¹ Within Pyongyang some 93 percent of all buildings had been destroyed and there had been an enormous level of damage and destruction done to the environment. Much of the industrial and agricultural infrastructure that had been put in place by the colonial Japanese administration had been destroyed, and the North found itself in a situation with something of a blank slate needing to rebuild much of its agricultural and industrial base and to rehabilitate much of the natural environment.

North Korean institutions did so, engaging much technical expertise from both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and incorporating much of the intellectual/ideological influence of Stalinist era central planning.² Once the war was over from a military perspective (in the political and diplomatic senses it has, of course, never ended), North Korea’s bureaucracy spent quite a short period re-organising and assessing the damage done during hostilities. By September 1953 North Korea had formulated a “Three Year Plan” for the reconstruction of the country, and entered into negotiations with the USSR for an extension of its credit lines.

The industrial and environmental policy which external credit paid for focused primarily upon what I will term an “impositional” approach to the natural environment, in which industrial or infrastructural development is simply imposed on or within the environment, essentially regardless of context. Examples include iron and steel works, such as those reconstructed at Huanghae, Kimchaek and Sungjin, an oil refinery at Nampo, power stations at Sup’ung and Pyonyang, new mills at Sinuiju and Pyongyang, a fertilizer plant at Hungnan, and a seafood cannery at Sinpo.

In the agricultural realm North Korea obtained a large number of tractors and sewing machines, as well as vast tonnages of fertilizer. Kuark describes the policy outlook of Pyongyang’s Department of Agriculture as having only two primary goals: “the swift reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-shattered factories making agricultural implements, and of farms and irrigation systems so as to increase grain production and meet the pent-up demand for food,” and secondly “the rapid socialization of agriculture by means of collectivization.”³

There are many examples from this period of environmental improvements following impositional models, Prybyla noting that “in 1956 alone, the Chinese army gave 740,000 man - days to the building of irrigation ditches and dams,

1 Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

2 Jan S. Prybyla, “Soviet and Chinese Economic Competition Within the Communist World,” *Soviet Studies* 15 (1964) : 464-473.

3 Yoon T. Kuark, North Korea’s Agricultural Development during the Post-War Period, *The China Quarterly*, 14 (1963): 82-93.

including the Pyong Nam reservoir.”⁴ It is also reported that out of state investment between 1954 and 1956 of some US\$ 120 million, nearly US\$ 80 million (4,200 million “old” Won), went on “irrigation and river dyke projects.”⁵ Such projects led to a rapid increase in productive agricultural capacity and by 1957 some 301,350 extra acres of arable land and 940,800 extra acres of irrigated land had been put into a serviceable condition.⁶ Although very little consideration was given to matters strictly conservational or preservational, during this period large scale reclamation of virgin land or destruction of forests appears not to have taken place; merely improvements in already industrialized agricultural land which led to the overall increase in industrial production. It is, in fact, quite difficult during this initial period to see a distinctly North Korean or Juche orientated approach to the environmental or to agricultural development in spite of Kim Il Sung’s statement from 1956 that “Rice is immediately socialism. We cannot build socialism without rice.”⁷ The statement bears much in common with Lenin’s “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country,”⁸ in that it serves as the foundation base for North Korean socialism just as Lenin’s statement determines the color of Soviet Communism. Perhaps, Kim Il Sung’s statement outlines a socialism marked by agrarian resource and capacity issues of the sort that would dog North Korea throughout its history.

“Great Leap Forward” Influenced Policy

North Korea’s initial period of impositional environmental development focused upon rapid capacity increase was short lived, however, as upon the death of Stalin and the solidification of the power of Nikita Khrushchev as Soviet Premier a process of radical and abrupt political change began that would have a direct impact upon such environmental strategies. Khrushchev’s 1956 “Secret Speech” denouncing Stalin and recent Soviet critiques of both the strategy and political approach of Kim Il Sung (“Comrade Kim Il Sung is surrounded by bootlickers and careerists [...]” was the opinion of a Soviet official named Petrov according to the Hungarian Charge d’Affaires in Pyongyang at the time),⁹ forced a shift in the positioning of the parties involved within the War-

4 Prybyla, “Soviet and Chinese Economic Competition Within the Communist World,” 469.

5 Kuark, “Korea’s Agricultural Development during the Post-War Period,” 83.

6 Ibid.

7 Kim Il Sung, “Rice is Immediately Socialism” (letter to the chairmen of the South Pyongan provincial party committee), Jan 28th, 1956, *Works*, vol. 10, (Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), 24.

8 Lenin, “Speech Delivered At The Ninth All-Russia Conference Of The Russian Communist Party” September 22, 1920, *Collected Works*, vol. 31(1965), 275-279.

9 L. Keresztes, “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” 1955;

saw Pact, a breakdown in relations between the USSR and China known as the Sino-Soviet split and rapid political and diplomatic movement away from the USSR by North Korea. This tumultuous period, however, also created the political and ideological space for a revision Pyongyang’s policy towards nature and the natural world that in the end would enable a distinct “Juche orientated” environmental strategy to emerge.

During this era of distantness from the Soviet Union Mao directed Chinese industrial, agricultural, and environmental policy away from the path of development following during the “First Five Year Plan” and instigated what has become known as the “Great Leap Forward.” During this time Chinese environmental and developmental policy was ingrained with an almost existential urgency.

Judith Shapiro identifies multiple possibilities of intent within mass campaigns of popular infrastructural or industrial capacity building (known as “Yundong”), stating that the “goals of these mass mobilizations for rapid change varied from socio-political transformation to economic development, and the campaigns served variously to introduce new policies, change attitudes, rectify malpractice and purge class enemies [...] and were often adjusted upward as campaigns continued.”¹⁰

This sense of almost impossible pace served to break natural and historical connections citizens had with their local natural environments, and sometimes religious and spiritual traditions connected with them, to disorientate and to militarize—and it is this disorientated head-long rush into change that enabled many of the projects attempted and achieved within the Great Leap Forward to take place. This impossible pace has been described as “revolutionary speed” and the individuals and communities engaging with it as “revolutionary models,” in which the perfect manifestation of a particular element of theory or policy is personified or anthropomorphized. One famous example of such a “revolutionary model” in practice being that built around the village of Dazhai and its inhabitants who undertook a legendarily rapid reconstruction of their farming land after an incident of devastating flooding.¹¹

It may have been the concept of revolutionary urgency and its physical or narratological manifestation as “revolutionary speed” that most inspired Kim Il Sung, because by September 1958 the Ch’ollima Movement was launched (Ch’ollima being a mythical flying horse, a Korean version of Pegasus). This

B. Salontai, Cold War History Research Project Budapest, www.coldwar.hu (accessed October 20 2013).

10 Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 71.

11 Mitch Meisner, “Dazhai, The Mass Line in Practice,” *Modern China* 1, no. 4 (1978): 27-62.

was the first of a number of categories of “revolutionary urgency” defined within North Korea over the course of its existence. However, in the Korean context the acute sense of revolutionary urgency and transformation which was a hallmark of the “Great Leap Forward” appears to have been blunted so far as agriculture was concerned. Kim Il Sung was perhaps aware of the impending and obvious failure of much of the Chinese policy (which would result in economic collapse and abject and acute famine). More than that disaster, perhaps, Pyongyang’s institutions considered particular issues of labor supply within North Korea, the general size of the population and the potential dangerousness of large groupings of people. Whatever their reasoning, Pyongyang and Kim Il Sung for the most part refused gargantuan scale mega projects, such as the draining of lakes or the wide scale demolition and terracing of mountains, and focused instead through the Ch’ollima movement on a smaller scale of development, abandoning much of the radicalism of the Chinese model.

Technocratic/ Indigenous Approaches to the Development of the Environment

The period of ferment created by the Sino-Soviet Split and the difficulties of the “Great Leap Forward” forced North Korea to adopt strategies of development focused upon agricultural and environmental productivity that were relatively indigenous to it; although we must not downplay the role of technicians from either the USSR or the PRC, even at the height of Sino-Soviet split Soviet technicians were involved in preparatory works for some hydrological projects.¹²

Kim Il Sung’s “Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country” serves as the foundational grounding for both more general industrial and agricultural strategy of North Korea, and for the practical policies to be followed within that strategy. Within the theses Kim Il Sung lays out a fully “Juche oriented” approach to agricultural and environmental development.

Environmental development was to be achieved through the functioning of the “three revolutions movement” within the landscape in which Juche thinking would be applied to the environmental and the agricultural through embedding of conceptions and strategies relating to “revolutionary” technical, cultural and ideological elements within development. The Theses also called for a hierarchical organization of agricultural production according to the following pattern: peasantry over the urban working class, agriculture over industry, and the rural over the urban. The full incorporation of industrial management practice into the agricultural and rural economy was also called for, as well as the final

12 Prybyla, “Soviet and Chinese Economic Competition Within the Communist World.”

stage in the collectivization of rural property,¹³ in which the post Korean war settlement of mixed pattern of land ownership with agriculture would end and cooperatives be abolished in favor of collectives.

Following these changes, the Theses call for agricultural and natural landscape development according to the same systemic approach as urbanized or industrial areas, not just to achieve the goals of the “three revolutions movement,” but also to further the wider revolutionary aims of Juche: “in order to eliminate the distinctions between the working class and the peasantry, it is necessary to rid the countryside of its backward state in technology, culture and ideology.”¹⁴

In the “Rural Theses” we perhaps can see, for the first time, the beginning of a real systemization of political ideology related to the environmental field and which led Peter Atkins of Durham University to describe the result as leading to “the landscape of the DPRK [...becoming...] an outcome or a by-product of socialism but also a key medium through which society is transformed.”¹⁵ The technological revolution called for in the “rural theses” was to have led to a rapid and wide-scale reconfiguration of agricultural practice, within five key areas. These were the expansion of irrigation and water supply, the electrification of the countryside and rural areas, land “realignment” so as to incorporate mechanized agricultural processes, increase in the use of chemical fertilizers and the reclamation of tidal lands and swamps to create more land for agricultural production.¹⁶

We can investigate the practical environmental policy, ideological development and their manifestations derived from the “Rural Theses” and other statements and pronouncements from Kim Il Sung during this period more easily by examining the realm of hydrological engineering.

The Korean Peninsula, and especially the North, had always been a highly irrigated geographic area,¹⁷ and there had been much irrigation construction during the colonial Japanese period.¹⁸ However, after the publication of the Theses, North Korea adopted a radically techno-centric approach, disregarding almost completely gravity-fed systems. What followed, inspired by the “Theses,”

13 Kim Il Sung, “Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country,” *Works* vol. 18, (Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964).

14 *Ibid.*

15 Peter J. Atkins, “The Dialectic of Environment and Culture: Kimilsungism and the North Korean Landscape” in *Environment and Development, Views From the East and the West*, ed. A. Mukherjee (New Delhi, Concept, 1985), 328.

16 Kim “Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country” (1964).

17 Conrad Totman, *Pre-industrial Korea And Japan in Environmental Perspective*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

18 Ramon H. Myers, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

was the building of an extensive and elaborate system of pumping stations and reservoirs (3,505 pumping stations for the main trunk network alone,¹⁹ to spread water throughout upland and lowland areas). Between 1954 and 1998, irrigated areas increased from some 227,000 hectares to 1.2 million hectares (As of 1990 there are apparently “1,700 reservoirs throughout the country, watering 1.4 million hectares of fields with a ramified irrigation network of 40,000 kilometers, which irrigated about 70 percent of the country’s arable land.”²⁰ Also, according to Yu and a Library of Congress report from 2004, North Korea built a field based system, whereby 400,000 hectares of upland land is irrigated by “mobile water guns, sprinkler, furrow and other drip methods for fruit trees.”²¹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, these developments and the completely irrigated furrow system transformed upland agriculture, massively increasing productive capacity and transferred enormous spaces that were previously wild to agricultural exploitation.²²

Secondarily to hydrological engineering we can also examine the impact of the Theses on what Pyongyang termed “under-utilized” land, through the medium of land reclamation. “For The Large Scale Reclamation of Tidelands” published in 1968 contains Kim Il Sung’s foundational statement on this issue that, “In order to increase grain output and mechanize farm work in our country, it is imperative to bring tidelands under cultivation [...]”²³ Not only does Kim and North Korea focus on the need to cultivatable exploitable land through strategies of tidal reclamation, but themes within the “Theses” related to furthering technical and ideological revolution are also sustained through this reclamative work: “Reclaimed lands are vast plains where machines can be used for every kind of farm work. Therefore a small amount of manpower is needed to tend them.”²⁴

As well as serving such ideological aims, reclamation projects can also serve to be demonstrative of Juche thinking’s reflexivity and practicality. Within larger projects, for example, problems appear to be the source of their own solution—one example being an iron ore mine in South Hwanghae Province

19 United Nations Development Programme, Food and Agricultural Organisation, *DPR Korea: Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) Program: Identification of Investment Opportunities*. vs. 1-3, (New York City: UNDP, 1988).

20 Chong-ae Yu, (2005), *The Rise and Demise of Industrial Agriculture in North Korea*, Paper No. 08-05, The Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 11.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Kim Il Sung, “For The Large Scale Reclamation of Tidelands,” (1968) in *Works* vol. 33, (Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House), 73.

24 Ibid.

that faced with issues related to the disposal of the mine’s spoil, was instructed to “begin dumping this [spoil] in the sea from a long conveyor belt to create a causeway linking several islands to the mainland.”²⁵ Atkins identifies three of the projects as being “the damming of the sea at the Amnok River to create 110,000 hectares,” “in South Pyongan province a stretch of land out to sea up to sixteen kilometers” and “in South Hwanghae all the deeply indented bays were to be dammed.”²⁶

“Arduous March” Era—Emergency Environmental Strategies

The political and academic narrative surrounding North Korea and Juche thinking today generally site its environmental strategy’s failure and collapse within more recent years. There has been extensive research focused upon the food crisis of the early to mid 1990s, for example, with much of it connected with the developing academic field of transition politics and economics. This field sees North Korea as an outlier of political statistics, one pole of a spectrum of transition inevitably away from communism and socialism. The famine period of the early 1990s is seen by many researchers and politicians as evidence of the failure of Juche and North Korea’s historical economic, agricultural, and industrial policies, reinforcing still further the inevitability of its collapse and transition.²⁷ For many analysts the famine is an indictment of the entire structure of North Korea’s institutional framework and not policies derived from its ideological approach.

However, North Korea’s difficulties at this time could be seen in perhaps less damning terms, the result of a “perfect storm” of contributing factors including unrelated environmental impacts such as serious droughts in the early 1990s which reduced harvest levels and intense and sustained rain fall events in 1994 that further reduced harvest levels and damaged agricultural land. Of course objectivity demands the connectivity of these environmental factors with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the wider communist economic realm that North Korea depended on for much of its trade and eco-

25 S. Kim, “New Heightened Spirits Prevail in Tideland Reclamation Project,” *Minju Choson*, 20th December 1983, JPRS/DTIC Document 4110/062, www.dtic.mil (accessed October 01, 2013).

26 Atkins, “The Dialectic of Environment and Culture: Kimilsungism and the North Korean Landscape,” 326.

27 Meredith Woo-Cumings, *The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lesson*, ADB Research Institute, Research Paper 31 (2002); Nicholas Eberstadt, *The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2007).

conomic support coupled to the cumulative and frequent technical inefficiencies and discrepancies within the DPRK's industrial and agricultural sector.²⁸

Whatever the causation, the impacts were dramatic. Samuel Kim reports that North Korea's economy contracted by some 13.7 percent in 1990 alone, and a further 18.8 percent by the year 1994.²⁹ Whereas in 1975 Pyongyang had exported some 328,000 tonnes of rice and corn, instability created through problems in central planning had caused North Korea to begin importing rice and other grains which had reached a tonnage of some 1.2 million tonnes by 1990.³⁰

Faced with such a disastrous set of circumstances and enormously negative changes in the possibilities for seeking help to deal with them, North Korea adopted some radical survivalist strategies. In 1992 the Russian Federation and Commonwealth of Independent states, the successor bodies to the DPRK's former ally, the Soviet Union, informed the DPRK that all future trade was to be at world market prices, and worse than that for a country with virtually no hard currency reserves, by cash in advance of delivery. Within the year Kim Il Sung announced what was known as the "Let's Eat Two Meals a Day Campaign,"³¹ at the very least presaging the famine that was to come.

In the field of environmental management, strategies also abruptly changed. As an emergency solution to the crisis the authorities within the forestry sector abandoned even the pretence of long running policies focused on the need and aspiration for afforestation in an attempt to create more land area for cultivation of basic crops: "The Ministry of Land Management and Environmental Protection [...] sanctioned deforestation, in order to produce crops on the marginal land, especially on sloping land."³² Internal documents and data from North Korea on the extent of such deforestation are not forthcoming, but external studies undertaken by United Nations agencies after 1995, the peak year of disruption, note the impact of this change in policy. Bobilier records the results of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation (UNDP/FAO) investigation which concluded "that more than 500,000 hectares of marginal lands were deforested and cultivated."³³ Recent FAO reporting has asserted, utilizing statistics sourced through the "FAO STAT" system, that forestry cover in the

28 Ibid.

29 S. Kim, "North Korea in 1995: The Crucible of Our Style Socialism," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 1 (1996): 61-72.

30 Ibid.

31 Kim, "For The Large Scale Reclamation of Tidelands" (1968).

32 B. Bobilier, *Environmental Protection and Reforestation in DPR of Korea, Project Evaluation and Feasibility Study* (Pyongyang: Triangle Generation Humanitaire, 2002), 5.

33 Ibid.

northern half of the peninsula declined in total from some 8.2 million hectares in 1990 to 6.8 million hectares by the year 2000,³⁴ or that nearly a fifth of total forest cover was removed in a decade.

Post “Arduous March”/Famine Period—Towards a “Greening” North Korea

There is no doubt that the famine era was a time of great challenge for North Korea and much of the research and popular literature that focuses on the possibility of its collapse, dissolution and eventual reunification with the Republic of Korea (ROK) derives from the seeming inability of its institutions and leadership to respond with meaningful or positive solutions at the time. In the midst of this tumultuous period, however, it appears to be possible to determine the development of a set of new institutional responses towards the environment within North Korea and an increase in its internal bureaucratic and ideological ability to mitigate against environmentally destructive practice. We might even be able to declare this process of development “greening.”

There are a number of questions to be raised, of course, surrounding the potential existence or emerging of a “green” North Korea, the first of which being, given the DPRK’s apparent lack of receptivity towards ideas deriving from outwith its traditional ideological realm, how have such ideas been encountered and where is their source? If the politically triangulating approach North Korea took to cope with the geopolitical shifts during the Sino-Soviet Split and the politically and ideologically evasive action adopted as the difficulties with the “Great Leap Forward” in China became clear are borne in mind, it might not be surprising that, forced to adjust to this new era in which North Korea had even fewer political allies and virtually no economic or practical support, it attempted similar triangulations.

In order to extract itself from the period of crisis and disaster, Pyongyang and its institutions had been forced to ask for help from external agencies. The World Food Programme, UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and International Committee of the Red Cross are some of the initial entrants. Authorities in Pyongyang are regarded by many scholars³⁵ as having, despite being beset by crisis and potential regime collapse, utilized the entrance of these organizations to their own advantage: “These floods played an important public relations role insomuch as they facilitated

34 FAO, *Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005* (Geneva: United Nations, 2005).

35 Woo-Cumings, *The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lesson*; Eberstadt, *The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe*; Marcus Noland, *Korea After Kim Jong Il* (Washington DC, Institute for International Economics, 2004).

the North Korean government's portrayal of the famine as a product of natural disaster."³⁶

Although I do not aim to contribute to the debate surrounding the veracity of Pyongyang's claims surrounding the famine, nor whether outside agencies and other NGO have been subject to institutional exploitation by North Korea,³⁷ I believe that it is undeniable that the entrance of western institutional actors into the role of funders and supporters of some aspects of its institutional and governmental framework has enabled North Korea to develop its governance capabilities and equip itself with some of the bureaucratic and ideological tools to survive in the post-Soviet and post famine era. This institutional development focused its ideological approach, so far as the environment was concerned, in the direction of a rapidly developing institutional consensus towards the conservation and preservational.

Following the immediate crisis and famine, both UNDP and the FAO engaged with North Korean institutions to build capacity and capability within the environmental sector. Part of these institutions was an assessment of the state and condition of North Korea's forest stock and the functioning of institutions and structures within its forestry and timber extraction sector. The results of this review were summarized within the three volume series, "DPR Korea: Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) Program, Identification of Investment Opportunities." This document is now virtually unobtainable in its original version, however, Hippel and Hayes,³⁸ Bobilier,³⁹ and others make extensive reference to it. Bobilier summarizes the UNDP/FAO exercise's findings in a feasibility study published by the French NGO "Triangle Generation Humanitaire" in 2002.

North Korea's forestry sector asserted the researchers was beset with problems, including "bad management of forests and wood shortages, increased erosion, leading to a loss of soil productivity in rice fields and a high vulnerability to flood damage, loss of soil productivity in sloping lands [...] impossibility for natural regeneration."⁴⁰ UNDP/FAO researchers and Bobilier, however, maintain that as far as institutional commitment was concerned "the Government recognizes the importance of land management and reforestation."⁴¹ Encoun-

36 Marcus Noland, S. Robinson, and T. Wang, "Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 49, no. 4 (2001), 746.

37 Noland, *Korea After Kim Jong Il*, 2004.

38 David F. Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, *The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance and Suggested Approaches to Sectoral Redevelopment* (Berkeley, CA: Nautilus Institute, 2002).

39 Bobilier, *Environmental Protection and Reforestation in DPR of Korea*.

40 *Ibid.*, 5.

41 *Ibid.*

tering such organizations and the environmental philosophy that inspired them derived from paradigms of conservation appears to have piqued the interest of North Korean institutions. Soon, policy statements and ideological or theoretical statements that included an element of environmental thinking emanated quite regularly from Pyongyang and a “greening” in both practical and ideological terms appeared underway.

What is it to be “Green” in a North Korean Context? In Practice and in Theory

It is tempting when addressing issues of policy development in North Korea, as it with most countries and political systems, to start with the realm of the ideological, and ask ourselves, what would it mean in an ideological sense to be “green” in a North Korean context? Is there now a “green” element to Juche or Songun thinking? Such searching, however, would be to assume that North Korea’s ideological system is in some way coherent or cohesive (Brian Myers of course asserts otherwise),⁴² and that Pyongyang’s academics or theoreticians will have first systematized environmental or “green” thinking within the wider ideological framework followed by the institutions and the population in general, or indeed such a framework exists or is followed at all. It is in fact best to start with the realm of practical policy, as this is often where ideas are first generated within North Korea, ideological or theoretical formulations coming later as a way of explaining, justifying or extracting some propaganda or presentation advantage from success.⁴³

A good example of ideological development in North Korea initially sourced from the output of practical environmental policy development, and itself derived from the practice undertaken during a collaborative exercise involving external partners revolves around wind generation technology. In May and September of 1999, a team of American energy specialists from The Nautilus Institute including the academics Peter Hayes, and David Von Hippel along with their North Korean counterparts, installed seven wind generators, with just over ten kilowatts of capacity, and a power house with electrical equipment that could provide stand-alone power, as well as interface with the North Korean grid, at Unhari, a small coastal village 70 miles west of Pyongyang.⁴⁴ This was the first instance of wind power installation in North Korea, as well as the first

42 Bryan R. Myers, *The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters*, (New York: Melville House, 2001).

43 Han S. Park, *The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002).

44 David F. Von Hippel et al., *Rural Energy Survey In Unhari Village, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK): Methods, Results and Implications* (Berkeley, CA: Nautilus Institute, 2001).

time an energy survey or socio-economic assessment of the impact of a project had been undertaken on any issue.

Having been exposed to the possibilities of utilizing wind as a source of power generative capacity during this exercise and the environmental/conservation theory behind its utilization and practice during the Americans' visit in 1999, North Korea has continued the development of wind power generation capacity and policies designed to support it. Pyongyang was supported in this by the gift of two fully functional large capacity turbines from the Danish turbine blade manufacturer, Vestas,⁴⁵ and there are now many other turbine projects in the DPRK some with turbines of a capacity of up to 75KW and an estimated nationwide production of 3MW by the end of 2004. Pyongyang has also formulated a National Wind Energy Strategy which involves comprehensive mapping of areas of exceptional wind speed and, therefore, potential power generation, and extending national capacity to 100MW through the development of test sites running at up to 10MW a site.⁴⁶ Most surprisingly, perhaps, is the fact that South Korea's Ministry of Unification has examined the prospect of collaborating with North Korea's Ministry of Power on a project to construct a series of 750KW turbines near Rason, enough to generate the power for a population of 150,000 people.⁴⁷

Investing in wind turbine technology of course could be regarded as simply a normal part of energy production planning policy, as it would be for most other nations. However, in North Korea's case it is important to remember that this was a country facing utter economic and institutional ruin, whose power production and transmission systems were reliant on materials and support that either no longer existed or unobtainable due to its lack of hard currency reserves. Thus, wind power's development as a technology and a possibility has seemed vital to its bureaucracy and institutions on the grounds of cost and reduction in dependence on foreign agencies. Naturally Pyongyang has continued to explore the possibilities for the utilization of nature's energy generating capacity and to move towards operating as much as possible as a low-carbon economy. This is indeed environmentally friendly. However, it is better for the environment in the way that the countries of the former Soviet Union drastically reduced their carbon emissions after 1992 (presenting countries such as the Russian Federa-

45 Vestas, "Delivered Vestas turbines as of 31 December 2011," <http://www.vestas.com/en/about-vestas/profile/track-records/results-%E2%80%93countries-and-regions.aspx>, (accessed 19 October 2013).

46 David F. Von Hippel, P. Hayes, "DPRK Energy Sector Development Priorities: Options and Preferences," *Energy Policy* 3 (2009).

47 Wikileaks, 2011.

tion and Ukraine with a very good deal in terms of their post Kyoto protocol position,⁴⁸ due to the collapse of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact industrial sector.

Following these new practical strategies of policy focused on paradigms of action that are more overtly environmentally sensitive, North Korea has begun to incorporate new approaches towards the environmental realm within its own metaphysically nationalistic philosophical construction (as identified by Park).⁴⁹ Just as citizens of North Korea are expected to play their part in national glorification, so also in relation to the environment and the natural world.

During the periods in which environmental policy was focused upon paradigmatic relationships with the natural that we might term “impositional” or “transformational,” such as in the early 1960s, nature’s role was essentially that of a passive supportive element so far as nature and regime were concerned. The environment existed in order to be imposed upon or to be transformed, and its active role in North Korean ideology was as a subject or subjected element, as well as to generate the highest level of productive capacity as was possible.⁵⁰ Since the famine era, however, and following North Korea’s presentation of this disastrous period as a second “arduous march,” connected to the guerrilla struggle against Japanese occupation in the 1930s and 1940s, in which a seemingly hostile natural world was visualized as a force to be militarily overcome, the environment has been conceptualized in a different, more active way.⁵¹ North Korean ideology now apparently incorporates the environmental in an almost individualistic sense akin to those citizens who offer their support and loyalty to the governing sources of power within the country, namely the Kim dynasty (examples of which can be found in the commentary following the death of Kim Jong Il).⁵²

The Environmental as Legitimator/De-Legitimator

Internalizing North Korea’s Conception of “Green”

The environmental has thus entered the contemporary period, serving in North Korea as an element, subject and function of regime legitimacy and playing an important role in the legitimating process. Perhaps, the first example of this can

48 Christoph Bohringer, “Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances,” *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 107, no. 3 (2005), 563-581.

49 Park, *The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom*.

50 Kim, “Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country.”

51 KCNA, “Achievements Made During ‘Arduous March’”, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1997/9703/news3/13.htm#7>, 1987 (accessed 19 October 2013).

52 KCNA, “*Phenomena Witnessed During Mourning Days*,” (2011) <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201201/news07/20120107-30ee.html> (accessed 19 October 2013).

be seen not long after the famine period ended and in the midst of many connections with foreign environmental institutions, in the forestry management sector.

There had been a National Tree Planting Day for many years in North Korea, April 6, ostensibly commemorating the visit of Kim Il Sung in 1947 to Munsu Hill. This visit formed the foundational event within the Forestry Sector and is recounted in the text “Let Us Launch a Vigorous Tree Planting Movement Involving All the Masses.” However, in 1999 and without reference to the change, National Tree Planting Day became March 2. This new date commemorated an earlier event, on March 2, 1946, when Kim Il Sung climbed Mt Moran (on the outskirts of Pyongyang), with both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Suk. The reader will, perhaps, note that at this point in 1946 the hill climbing Kim Jong Il would have been four or five years old. In this way the institution of the National Tree Planting Day and the Forestry Sector for which it serves as the annual ceremonial connection around which popular events and other projects within the sector are organized is connected with the developing themes of environmental awareness, as well as serving to extend the grounds of both the legitimacy of the regime and of North Korea more generally. It does this through incorporating an environmentally focused act within an “on the spot guidance” visit, and within the context of North Korea’s “holy trinity” of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Suk (Kim Jong Il’s mother and anti-Japanese guerrilla heroine). It is a powerful image for North Korea and North Koreans, and indigenous readers would understand it as such. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described the background to the event in the following terms “On March 2, 53 years ago, the President Kim Il Sung climbed up Moran Hill together with the revolutionary fighter Kim Jong Suk and General Secretary Kim Jong Il and said that many trees should be planted there and turn it into a recreation place for the people [...]” and, accordingly, “the working people across the country are now all out in the drive to plant more trees in mountains and fields of the country on the occasion of the tree planting day.”⁵³

Regime Legitimacy and the Death of Kim Jong Il

Recently during the mourning/funereal period following Kim Jong Il’s death and the accession of Kim Jong Un to power there were many similar examples of the environmental utilization for the purposes of underlining, supporting or developing the legitimacy or superiority of the nation and regime. KCNA re-

53 KCNA, “Spring Tree Planting Begins in Korea,” <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9903/news03/02.htm#10>, 1999, (accessed 19 October 2013).

ported many at the time, including an inscription on Mt Paekdu glowing red (“Kim Jong Il’s autographic writings—‘Mt. Paektu, holy mountain of revolution. Kim Jong Il’— in particular, were bright with glow. This phenomenon lasted till 5:00 pm”),⁵⁴ the ice on the lake at the top of the mountain, Lake Chon cracking despite freezing temperatures, and even birds supposedly adopting postures of reverence or mourning. KCNA also reported:

“A natural wonder was also observed around the statue of the President standing on Tonghung Hill. At around 21:20 pm Tuesday, a Manchurian crane was seen flying round the statue three times before alighting on a tree. The crane stayed there for quite a long while with its head drooped and flew in the direction of Pyongyang at around 22:00 pm. Observing this, the director of the Management Office for the Hamhung Revolutionary Site, and others said in union that even the crane seemed to mourn the demise of Kim Jong Il born of Heaven after flying down there at dead of cold night, unable to forget him).”⁵⁵

Such events and reports serve to connect the legitimacy of the regime, representing as it does within its narrative and narratology, the manifestation of the Korean nation’s most positive elements, with the environmental realm. It does so through the connection of the nation as constructed and participated in within the human realm, with the natural world, allowing the environmental to form part of the metaphysical construction of Korean nationhood (a metaphysical approach to nationalism described by Park).⁵⁶

Externalizing North Korea’s conception of “Green”

Having examined the use of the environment as a tool for the national and regime legitimacy, one can conclude that they serve an important internal role within the perception created by the institutions of government that its citizenry are expected to adopt. It follows, therefore, that if such a use of the environment, in a “green” sense can be a positive factor in legitimating either the regime or the nation itself, it must be possible to utilize such a narrative in the external realm. North Korea has recently begun an incorporation of such legitimated practice into its management and narrative of external relations, both with non-governmental actors and foreign sovereign governments.

54 KCNA, “Phenomena Witnessed During Mourning Days” (2011).

55 Ibid.

56 Park, *The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom*.

The DPRK as Successful Environmental Actor

Since the year 2000 for example, North Korea has marked World Environment Day,⁵⁷ has instituted a “biodiversity day” from 2001, and associated this with the “International Day of Biodiversity.”⁵⁸ Since 2011, North Korea also marks annually “International Swamp Day,”⁵⁹ and has even established an “Environmental Protection Fund” in 2005, which, it is envisaged, will “augment financial and material support to covering the whole land with forests and gardens as required in the new century, protecting bio-diversity, water resources, atmospheric environment and land resources and their sustained development and use on a scientific basis.”⁶⁰ North Korea has also reorganized its internal legal frameworks surrounding usage of land and the protection of the environment.

North Korea utilizes its commitment to all of these transnational days, as well as its new systems of environmental law in order to leverage up its role within regional diplomatic initiatives that focus upon the environment. Within this regional context Pyongyang now seeks to develop relationships with its near neighbors focusing on conservation and the environment in order to support wider regional sustainability of agricultural production and environmental management. North Korea is part of the “Greater Tumen Initiative,” a project shared between it, Russia, Mongolia and China to reduce water pollution, habitat loss, and reductions in biodiversity in the areas surrounding the Tumen River, as well as wider issues of biodiversity. It is also part of the North East Asian Forest Forum, which exists to promote and develop strategies for forest restoration in the region. Ultimately, Pyongyang utilizes these regional and local collaborations and relationships based on environmental issues to not only increase the level of authority proffered by such relationships within its internal context, among its own population, but also to function as a contrast between it and nations which are not perceived as being so environmentally sound or engaged, namely, the USA, Japan, and South Korea.

57 KCNA, “World Environment Day Observed” (2000), <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2000/200006/news06/05.htm#6> (accessed 19 October 2013).

58 KCNA, “International Day of Biodiversity Observed in DPRK” (2007), <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2007/200705/news05/23.htm#11> (accessed 19 October 2013).

59 KCNA, “World Swamp Day Observed,” <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201102/news02/20110202-10ee.html>, 2011, (accessed 19 October 2013).

60 KCNA, “Environment Protection Fund Established” (2005) <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200507/news07/15.htm#4> (accessed 19 October 2013).

The United States/South Korea/Japan as Environmental Friends

North Korea within its diplomatic and “propaganda” narratives is something of a “past master” when it comes to de-legitimative strategy. If one examines the output for example of its information/propaganda ministries or from its art studios one will be aware of the image presentation of Americans, in particular within its cultural narratives (at least those created by institutions of government), has been deliberately highly negative over the years. Americans are presented as physically degraded and ugly in most visual presentations, symbolic of their perceived moral and ideological degradation and decadence (Brian Myers’ 2011 book “The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans see Themselves and why it Matters” is a vital text for this theme), and are contrasted with clean, tall, attractive and young Koreans as much as possible.

North Korea often contrasts within its news media and press releases its apparent goal as it sees it, of an international paradigm of self-determined, independent and self-reliant nations with what it sees as the United States and other western nations’ goal of imperialist, exploitative action against weak, disempowered nations whose sovereignty is constantly called into question. Along with its news agency KCNA, within its presentation of both international and local news, attributes social or economic misfortune (such as the credit crunch and economic downturn, or the recent riots in the United Kingdom), to what it perceives as the decadence and de-legitimate nature of ideological formulations of those nations.

The KCNA has also recently started to include environmental issues within this de-legitimative narrative. The Tsunami and Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011, for example, were utilized as a narrative tool to demonstrate the apparent weakness of the Japanese government as well as its economic and ideological model (“[...] the successive explosions at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant and the leakage of massive amounts of radioactive materials plunged humankind into a horrible nuclear disaster. Japan can never evade responsibility for it”).⁶¹ The United States is also a target of this de-legitimative strategy, its approach to managing the chemical aftermath of the Korean War is heavily critiqued (“The cases of the burial of defoliant proved that the US forces are not ‘guardians of freedom’ and ‘protector of peace’ touted by them but the biggest group of criminals in the world”), as its strategy towards climate change negotiation, the functioning of institutions such as the Kyoto protocol and the world

61 KCNA, “KCNA Blasts Japan’s Decision to Extend Sanctions against DPRK” (2011), www.kcna.co.jp (accessed 19 October 2013).

wide environmental impact of both the United States itself and its diplomatic and strategic priorities.⁶²

Conclusion – Is being “green” in North Korea “green” at all and does it matter?

Within this paper I have aimed to give clear account of the development environmental policies and approach during the cold war period within North Korea, as well as offering some demonstration of how these policies and the ideological/philosophical conceptions and construct behind them have been subject to change and transformation dependant on external factors, such as the diplomatic, military or political situation in which Pyongyang found itself at the time coupled with the method and practice of North Korea’s practical environmental and developmental policy. Secondly, I have aimed to provide clarification of the process through which North Korea has continued to utilize a pragmatic strategy during recent times. This includes Pyongyang’s incorporation of the environmental ideas and strategies of the institutional actors it engaged with for the first time during the famine period of 1992 to 1997, such as NGOs and departments of the United Nations, which were sourced from the “green” or environmental movements.

North Korea has incorporated such theory, strategy and approach in its own inimitable way, one which we may not immediately recognise as “green” or environmentally focused at all. Just as it is difficult, if not nigh on impossible to assess the reality of any element of action, strategy or theory that derives from North Korea, it is, perhaps, impossible to determine whether Pyongyang has really undergone an ideological or policy transfer to a “green” or environmental paradigm. However, the fact of the incorporation of apparently “green” or environmental terminology and practice within not only the institutional management of some of Pyongyang’s areas of economic priority, such as energy production or industrial development, but also within its presentation/information/propaganda framework and both its internal and external legitimative/delegitimative narratives and strategies, perhaps, suggests something that in North Korean terms is more important. For Pyongyang, it seems, that being “green” or focused on the environment serves as a useful tool in the maintenance and construction of its institutional functionality, national capacity and the continuation of not only its ideological construction, but also its dynastic line. For North Korea there can be no greater level of sincerity or importance. **Y**

62 KCNA, “US Premeditated Environmental Pollution Blasted in S. Korea” (2011), www.kcna.co.jp (accessed 19 October 2013).