

outnumber resources. If not carefully implemented, Cuny's recommendations could discourage donors' assistance. I suggest a more realistic proposal: organizations, accepting that donors have an agenda and must be accountable to their sources of funding, should select those whose interests are similar to the specific development needs of the community. Of course, this too has its setbacks; it should be done prior to the disaster and still requires a lot of time, planning and research. Regarding the lack of a political approach, although he clearly stated that the book will not include anything related to politics, political issues are crucial for disaster relief response. These are country and time-specific, but readers should know that due to the lack of political background, the book can only be a partial guideline. Thus, readers should expect disaster relief practices to be subject to other influences.

Even with the passing years, the book, written by one of the first disaster relief specialists, is a very important contribution to the field of disaster relief. It provides general knowledge about issues useful for a comprehensive understanding of the impact of aid mechanisms in post-disaster development. Except for the mention of some outdated relief organizations and projects, the book's teachings continue to be current, significant and relevant. Since then, the field has seen no new significant contributions. Because of its richness in information, examples and illustrations, the book is like a handbook that anyone interested in disaster relief can continually refer to. Even though it does not elaborate on a specific topic, it gives the reader a solid foundation to begin further research on how to respond to disasters within the context of development.

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THE LAND OF THE RISING INSTITUTIONS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AS AN EXPLANATION OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN

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Krauss, Ellis S. and Robert J. Pekkanen. *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP: Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. 311 pages. ISBN 978-0-8014-4932-1

This work is an attempt to apply the concept of historical institutionalism to the case of one of the most successful parties within a democratic country, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan. The LDP is a conservative party founded in 1955 with membership ranging from center to right-wing. Ellis S. Krauss and Robert J. Pekkanen argue that attempts to explain the rise and fall of the LDP lack explicative substance because they were unable to determine how, fifteen years after the 1993 electoral reform, the LDP was still able to maintain political power within Japanese politics. Krauss and Pekkanen use historical institutionalism to explain the functions of the LDP's support organizations: the *kōenkai*, or Japanese political support groups, party factions, Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC) and party leadership both within the traditional '55 system and post-electoral reform. *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP: Political Party Organizations and Historical Institutions* argues that if the LDP is viewed using historical institutionalism, it is possible to determine both *why* the LDP functions unlike other political parties within a parliamentary system and *how* the LDP was able to maintain power after sweeping electoral reform.

The authors comment that the predictions of the fall of the LDP were insufficient because they did not take into account the fact that the LDP was shaped and structured based on the actions of politicians that were attempting to manipulate the party during a particular time period. At the core of this work

are two main arguments: first, the authors argue that traditional explanations of the rise of the LDP ignore the fact that it does not function like a normal party in a parliamentary system. The Japanese parliamentary system is centered on the Diet, which is the strongest decision-making body in Japan. The Diet consists of two houses: the House of Councillors and the House of Representatives. However, unlike the British parliamentary system, members of the Diet are elected using a single non-transferable voting (SNTV) system. In the SNTV, the people vote for candidates in a multi-candidate race that allows for candidates from the same party to run against each other. This increases the chances of factions occurring within the different political parties. For Krauss and Pekkanen, previous explanations regarding the rise in power of the LDP ignored this integral fact, therefore ignoring the influences of factions within Japanese politics.

Moreover, because of the historical context of the LDP's rise in power, Krauss and Pekkanen comment that it is necessary to view the LDP as an institution. This is because institutions are "durable patterned organizations composed of established rules and relationships" which are influenced by the actions of multiple actors (p. 2). The historical context of the creation of the party matters because, in the long run, the consequences of the actions of historical members will have a lasting effect on the party's structure and operation. Previous theories did not classify the LDP as such; therefore, these theories could not predict the reaction of the party to the change in the electoral system.

Second, they argue that historical institutionalism is a better method to understanding the workings of the LDP because it takes into account other factors, such as interpersonal relationships and patterned behavior. Krauss and Pekkanen comment that political analysts assumed that many aspects of the LDP's party organization were created and institutionalized in the early years of LDP party dominance; however, that is not necessarily the case. In particular, *kōenkai*, factions, and the PARC did not truly solidify into the institutions that most Japanese political analysts recognize until the 1980s. Therefore, these party institutions must have been created at an earlier time. The timeliness of this creation would help members to learn and eventually normalize certain behavior, therefore influencing how the LDP institutions would change in relation to electoral reform. For Krauss and Pekkanen, the electoral reform cannot truly explain the changes within Japanese politics because it ignores other potential influences, such as patterned behavior, that were created and normalized during the 1970s and 1980s.

One of the main strengths of this book is its organizational structure. The book is organized into ten chapters, with each chapter using supporting evi-

dence from interviews with former LDP politicians, *Asahi Shinbun* articles and quotes, case studies and empirical research. In particular, the interviews both illustrate the inner workings of the politicians' personal political machines and exemplify the rigidity that characterizes institutions. Furthermore, the chapters correspond to the political party institutions as they were under the '55 system and then post-electoral reform. By arranging the book in this manner, Krauss and Pekkanen create a volume that both explains the historical underpinnings of the creation of each of these organizations and how each of these institutions were effected by the 1993 reform.

Another strength of this work is that the authors use Paul Pierson's main analytical concepts (institutional complementary, sequencing and path dependence) to help overcome some of the pitfalls of using historical institutionalism as a way to explain a political phenomenon. Krauss and Pekkanen admit that historical institutionalism has many pitfalls, including the tendency to not be explanatory or to not allow for a comparative analysis. Each of these concepts prevents the work from being viewed as an unrepeatably examination that only proves that history matters. The best way to understand this application is to analyze one of the chapters. In chapter three, Krauss and Pekkanen successfully argue that *kōenkai* was first an organizational process under the leadership of Kakuei Tanaka in the 1950s. As his success grew, it became obvious to other politicians that *kōenkai* were necessary political drivers. This mentality did not change after the 1993 electoral reform for many reasons. One reason is that the complementary institution of strict election laws is still in effect. As such, politicians must use *kōenkai*'s far-reaching effects to build voter-support.

In addition, the sequence of events regarding the creation of *kōenkai* is also integral to the understanding of how it became an institution. The creation of the voting system under the United States occupation is integral in understanding *kōenkai*. If the voting system determined by the American Occupation authorities and Japanese bureaucrats had been different, then *kōenkai* may not have been as powerful within politics and the party could have been shaped differently: the sequence of the events are integral in understanding how this aspect of the party functions. Furthermore, as *kōenkai* became institutionalized, there were both increasing returns for politicians to maintain these groups as well as a fear of the negative externalities (such as loss of power or prestige) if *kōenkai* were not maintained. In summation, Krauss and Pekkanen argue that the complementary institution of strict voting laws, the sequence of the history regarding *kōenkai* and the resulting path dependence are vital in understanding its longevity.

Using the historical institutionalist approach creates new insights regarding the 2007 electoral defeat. In this election, the LDP lost its majority in the upper house while the newly formed Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gained a large margin of seats. This loss can be explained using historical institutionalism by looking at the work done by Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi worked diligently to reform the LDP. His reforms included postal privatization and attempts to increase the role of the prime minister. However, these reforms created negative structural changes that would lead to the LDP's 2007 loss. As Imai Ryosuke and Kabashima Ikuo argue in the article "The LDP's Defeat in Crucial Single-seat Constituencies of the 2007 Upper House Elections," Koizumi's structural reforms expanded the rural-urban disparities and cut funds that were traditionally funneled into the LDP's major support groups within its *kōenkai*: industry and construction groups. Koizumi's reforms attacked the base that the LDP institution was built upon; therefore, leading to its subsequent downfall in 2007.

Problematically, the historical institutional approach has a particular flaw that is still seen in this work. Historical institutionalism focuses on the internal factors that cause change within a nation. Therefore, it ignores external pressures that can often lead to political change. As Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott comment in "Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism," historical institutionalism becomes too deterministic by focusing on just internal factors. By focusing just on internal factors, historical institutionalism ignores the external factors that can cause disturbances that will lead to institutional changes within a country. For instance, Japan heavily relies on exports to maintain its domestic economic well-being; hence, export-liberalizing forces such as globalization and trade agreements could lead to an increase in the effectiveness on outside competitive actors. These actors would be able to influence the domestic institutions, such as political parties. Ergo, the negative externalities created by the LDP's institutions, such as protection for inefficient economic sectors, are more likely to lead to economic disparities within the country. By not analyzing external factors, this work is unable to explain or predict important political changes within Japan, such as the LDP's stunning loss in the 2009 election.

By analyzing each of the LDP's political party organizations in the historical institutional context, the authors are able to illustrate the underpinnings of these groups that would make them less susceptible to change. As a result, their analysis of each of these organizations is groundbreaking because it can be used to thoroughly answer the question regarding how the LDP was able to maintain power fifteen years after a reform that was predicted to severely

weaken or even immediately cause the fall of the LDP. Using historical institutionalism, Krauss and Pekkanen create a new way to look at Japanese politics by shifting the focus of study from actor-centered functionalism to a methodology that does not fall into the trap of being too parsimonious or retrospectively deterministic.

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