wide community building process. In turn, this elevates the ROK’s regional status by allowing it to exert leadership and a certain leverage over the process. In sum, South Korea’s leadership as a middle power should be judged on whether or not it has successfully advanced the common interests of a group of states. This unfortunately remains a task extremely hard to fulfill in the presence of strong rivalry and mistrust between the main regional actors. Those common interests, however, are increasingly being successfully pursued in several functional areas in which Seoul has constructively contributed to the building of regional frameworks at an inter-governmental level. Its efforts should not be underestimated, since South Korea has increased its commitment to serve as a bridge for Northeast Asian cooperation and East Asian community building. By actively supporting and promoting regional initiatives through its foreign policy Seoul has more than once acted as a catalyst, facilitator and manager of processes related to the institutionalization of cooperation among its neighbors. The ROK as a regional middle power can thus be considered an important driving force when institutionalizing East Asia. PEAR

A CRITICAL VIEW OF COUNTERINSURGENCY: WORLD RELATIONAL STATE (DE)FORMATION
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The relations of wealth and power that define capitalism as a global system were created, in part, by long term, large scale processes subsumed by policy discourse and practice associated with the term “counterinsurgency.” Institutionally and practically, counterinsurgency coordinates coercive state institutions (military, police and intelligence) in a multipronged attack, including “civic action” and economic development, against an internal, armed rival. At the structural level, counterinsurgency is one of the political processes that creates and constitutes the spatial and developmental unevenness that characterizes the interstate system and world economy, asymmetrically driving militarization across the uneven zones of world systems. Historically, this military doctrine emerged to consolidate the colonial rule of the expanding empires of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. It rose to prominence in order to manage decolonization in the mid-twentieth century and has returned in the last decade to deal with the increasingly acute social problems of the neoliberal period. It is a world-relational process because, across all these periods, it connects the varied outcomes of state formation across the wide gulfs of power and wealth that characterize capitalism. In contemporary cases like Afghanistan, Chechnya, Columbia, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen, and reflecting its emergence out of the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, counterinsurgency has involved the lead effort by a strong state or the subsidization of a weaker one.

From Vietnam to Homeland Security

My interest in counterinsurgency began with efforts to understand the significance of my former Congressman, Robert Simmons. In his first campaign in
2000, allegations surfaced that he was a war criminal. While Simmons deflected the charges, his service in Vietnam was more complicated and morally ambiguous than straightforward soldiering. From 1970 to 1972, Simmons was a CIA advisor to the Police Special Branch in Phu Yen province. In this capacity, he helped his Vietnamese counterparts identify the civilian support networks of the National Liberation Front. He ran “penetration agents” to infiltrate the National Liberation Front, Communist Party and its related associations. He advised the Phu Yen Province Interrogation Center, participated in interrogations and denied medical treatment for injured prisoners. He trained paramilitary units and sent them out on missions to “neutralize” communist political cadres. He was knee-deep in the political intrigues and ethical quandaries entailed in a clandestine war against a guerilla movement for national liberation. He was a counterinsurgent.

As a congressman, Simmons supported the broad application of policies normally associated with counterinsurgency. One of the main goals of counterinsurgency is to separate the guerillas from the population; to this end, military trials and indefinite detention provide the juridical means to isolate guerillas, political cadres and their sympathizers from the general population for the duration of the conflict. For example, in South Vietnam, where Simmons served, 100,000 to 150,000 “national security detainees” languished in detention centers by 1972. The War on Terror saw similar systems: a complex of “theater internment facilities” in occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, a global network of CIA “black sites” and the infamous island prison at Guantanamo Bay. While Simmons did not have a direct hand in these policies, as a congressman, he traveled to Guantanamo Bay and defended the practice of indefinite detention at the prison.

More significantly, Simmons, as Chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, oversaw the creation of an elaborate domestic intelligence system: the now seventy-two Homeland Security fusion centers and the Homeland Security Information Network that link them together. Similar to the intelligence sharing systems created for counterinsurgency in Vietnam, the fusion centers bring together multiple agencies to share intelligence, both laterally across jurisdictional levels and vertically among local, state and federal governments. While common to the intractable dirty wars of counterinsurgency, this domestic intelligence network is unprecedented in US history and raises a series of troubling questions about the power of the executive.

Simmons, moreover, was not the only veteran of Vietnam-era counterinsurgency to reemerge in Homeland Security. Thomas Ridge, the first Secretary of Homeland Security, was, as an Army sergeant, a platoon leader and a participant in counterinsurgency operations. Bruce Lawlor, CIA Police Special Branch Advisor in Quang Nam Province, became the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) first Chief of Staff. Roger Mackin, who, as an army major, directed counterinsurgency operations in Da Nang City and ran its Intelligence and Operations Coordination center, first served as the DHS counter narcotics officer and later acted as the deputy undersecretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

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10 Howard Ball, U.S. Homeland Security (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 99; Audrey Hudson,
These biographical links between Vietnam-era counterinsurgency and contemporary Homeland Security speak to broader changes. In the last 30 years, three police innovations in the US have transformed the institution and practice in ways that resemble elements of counterinsurgency: (1) the creation of the first SWAT team in 1966 and the subsequent proliferation of paramilitary police units provide police with a militarized strike arm;\(^{11}\) (2) the rise of community policing embeds “peace officers” in neighborhoods and intends, counterinsurgency-style, to penetrate civil society organizations and redirect them toward security;\(^{12}\) and (3) the increasing computerization of crime statistics and mapping provides for the actuarial management of insecurities and centrally directed control.\(^{13}\) These three innovations are, today, coming together under the policy discourse of intelligence-led policing and institution of fusion centers.\(^{14}\)

This militarization of policing is changing the practices and institutions not only of policing but also the wider federal system. It speaks to longer term, larger scale processes than those we associate with the history of individual nation-states.

**World-Relation State (De)formation**

The career trajectories and institutional and practical homologies and linking Vietnam-era counterinsurgency and contemporary homeland security expose counterinsurgency as a process of world-relation state (de)formation. The relations of wealth and power that define capitalism as a global system were created by long term, large scale processes which were subsumed, in part, by policy discourse and practice associated with the term “counterinsurgency.” Institutionally and practically, counterinsurgency coordinates coercive state institutions (military, police and intelligence) in a multipronged attack, including “civic action” and economic development, against an internal armed rival. On the structural level, counterinsurgency is one of the political processes that creates and constitutes the spatial and developmental unevenness that characterizes the interstate system and world economy, asymmetrically driving militarization across the uneven zones of world systems.

Historically, this military doctrine of counterinsurgency emerged to consolidate the colonial rule of the expanding empires of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It rose to prominence to manage decolonization in the mid-twentieth century and returned in the last decade to deal with the increasingly acute social problems in the neoliberal period. It is a world-relational process because, across all these periods, it connects the varied outcomes of state formation across the wide gulfs of power and wealth that characterize capitalism. Contemporary cases in countries like Afghanistan, Chechnya, Columbia, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen reflect its emergence out of the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; counterinsurgency involves strong states leading or subsidizing such effort in weaker states.

While its proponents present counterinsurgency as a more liberal and culturally sensitive mode of rule that penetrates civil societies and their partners’ security forces run by civic leaders cultivating good governance, the critical theory developed here historicizes counterinsurgency in order to capture the neglected political processes that link the formation of strong states and deformation of weak states. Specifically, I argue that counterinsurgency is a pseudo-scientific policy discourse that pacifies populations agitated by “constant revolutionizing” of capitalist social relations and fabricates social order around the logic of accumulation. Institutionally, counterinsurgency boasts the secretive, non-parliamentary organs of state and institutes extra-legal space that has variously been called “the wild zone of power” or a “state of exception.” Practically, it politicizes security professionals in ways that undermine the rule of law and democratic process. It is policy discourse and practice of rule that offers insight into the long term, large scale processes of state (de)formation.
Problem Solving Theory and Critical Theory

As my point of departure, I take Robert Cox’s distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory. Counterinsurgency, like all policy discourses, is a “problem-solving theory,” which, by refusing to “reflect upon and transcend […] its own perspective,” accepts “the world as it finds, with prevailing social and power relations and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action.” In contrast, this essay develops an alternative, critical perspective that “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about.” This paper “is directed toward the very framework of action, or problematic, which [counterinsurgency] accepts as its parameters.”

Looking beyond the policy discourse and to historicize “counterinsurgency” as a symptom of longer term, larger scale processes of social change is not in theory the positivist sense of causal hypothesis to be tested and proven; instead, it is a process of historical theorization that traces the lineage of discreet discourse and practice as it is differentially deployed and (re)formed within an evolving relational structure of global social relations, animated by multiple determinations across intertwined temporal rhythms.

The natural starting point for such a critical theory is the existing policy discourse. General David Petraeus’ acclaimed Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines “insurgency” as “an organized protracted politico-military struggle to weaken the control of and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power or other political authority while increasing insurgent control,” and “counterinsurgency” as the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

Epistemologically, counterinsurgency is premised on positivist faith in calculability. Practically, this epistemic orientation manifests itself in the disaggregation of complicated social problems into measurable units. It animates a managerial approach to politics, where “insurgency” is rendered a technical problem of infiltration and subversion, not a political problem of social exclusion, economic underdevelopment and undemocratic political authority.

In this way, the “problem solving” theories that characterize counterinsurgency as a policy discourse simplify messy and indeterminate political processes into legible and neat processes that can be managed. The assumptions of problem solving theory evaporate in the heat of messy and indeterminate historical processes. The so-called “intelligence failures,” then, reveal more than ineffective operations or analysis. Problem solving naturalizes current political arrangements and, by reducing political problems to technical problems of management, tries to out-administer deeply rooted conflicts that demand more fundamental solutions. Such linear and obsessively casual thinking fails to capture “non-rational” social formations — peasant and tribal societies, religious and ideological movements — raising the risk of an escalating series of miscalculations that spiral out of control and lead into a quagmire.

The Limits of Problem Solving Theory

In Vietnam, for example, problem solving orientation of policymakers and their faith in the efficacy of their systems of legibility created false impression of government success. Here, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and the failure to predict the Tet Offensive are the obvious examples. A scheme to measure trends in pacification, HES “required district advisers to complete monthly report cards, grading their areas on a number of social, economic, political and security standards.” These reports were aggregated and results overlaid on a map of South Vietnam to give visualization of relative security. In late 1967, just before the Tet Offensive demonstrated the communist’s political control of South Vietnam, counterinsurgency had “secured” 75 percent of South Vietnam’s population, according to HES.

While HES appeared as an accurate and clear representation of the war in Vietnam, it was, in practice, a statistical farce. The raw data fed into HES was highly subjective, reflecting the opinions of the US personnel who compiled them. Moreover, much of the HES data was falsified: Twenty percent of the villages were never evaluated and, yet, were still included in the HES reports.

Instead of addressing the shortcomings of HES that caused the system to project an obviously false perception of success on the eve of Tet, HES was reformed in such way to define the problem out of existence. After Tet,
many HES criteria — land reform, development of agriculture, eradication of disease, eradication of illiteracy, improvement of transportation — and pacification tasks — investigating government corruption, organizing political rallies, creating village organization, reconciling local differences — were dropped from the reporting requirements. A self-fulfilling prophecy, the population-rated “security” grew, reaching to 84 percent. William Colby, the CIA’s counterinsurgency chief in Vietnam, warned that such inaccurate reporting might lead Saigon “to delude itself about its standing with its own people.” When South Vietnam quickly collapsed only three years after US withdrawal, Colby’s fears were confirmed.

Color-coded maps, statistics and data tables fail to apprehend the social, ideological or cultural forces behind the government’s failure and the “insurgency’s” success. Systems like HES and other “problem solving theories” that do not interrogate the social determinants and implicit assumptions of the line of inquiry, privilege the quantifiable indices of “government progress” over illegible factors of culture and ideology. Here, one is reminded of the postwar exchange between Colonel Harry Summers, a military historian and a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) colonel. As Summers recalled it, he said, “You never defeated us in the field.” To which the NVA officer replied, "That may be true. It is also irrelevant." Despite overwhelming military superiority, the United States could not prevail in Vietnam. The answer does not lie in technical improvements to multiple doctrines but in critical theorizing that considers the wider political context of, for example, “counterinsurgency in Vietnam” and uses it to historicize “counterinsurgency” as a minor process that structures and is structured by deeper and longer historical relations.

**Toward a Critical Theory of Counterinsurgency**

Since counterinsurgency usually involves a stronger state intervening in a formerly colonized region (Vietnam, Central America, Afghanistan) or central government targeting a rebellious and marginalized ethno-racial group (Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya) it necessarily raises questions of colonial domination and uneven development. Instead of assuming a “world of interrelated and massively unequal sovereign jurisdictions” as natural condition of world order, I draw on world-systems analysis to explore how counterinsurgency operates as a world relational process creating and constituting the spatial and developmental unevenness that characterizes interstate system and world economy. Counterinsurgency is a process that animates the interactive and cross-pollinating political systems created by colonial relations, providing insight into the properly political aspects of the “development of underdevelopment,” a process normally conceived in more economic terms.

World-systems analysis is an appropriate literature to frame a critical study of counterinsurgency because one of the school’s greatest strengths is the shifting of the unit of analysis from mainstream social science’s blinding focus on individual states to larger world historic systems. While Immanuel Wallerstein defined the state in orthodox Weberian terms, he did argue for a wider view of state formation. To Wallerstein, the character and nature of any given state reflects its position and role in the modern capitalist world system. States with mostly core processes of capital accumulation are stronger and, thus, more able to influence the global division of labor to their benefit. Peripheral states, in contrast, “are usually unable to do very much to affect the axial division of labor, and in effect, are forced to accept the lot that has been given them.” The world system, then, requires “the existence of a multiplicity of states within the overall division of labor,” so that capitalists “can gain the advantages of working with states but also circumvent states hostile to their interests.”

If the processes of core-periphery differentiation and hierarchization led to an uneven distribution of strategies of accumulation across world-regions, then, there is a similarly varied development of political arrangements.

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19 Ibid., 323-324.
25 Ibid., 29, 50-52.
to maintain these conditions. Tracing the development of “pacification” back to sixteenth century Spanish military texts on the operations against indigenous Americans, Mark Neocelous identifies “the permanent pacification of the internal territory” as a necessary mission of capitalist states. “[S]ecurity is not […] some kind of universal or transcendent value but […] a mode of governing or political technology of liberal order building.” He writes:

[…] the gathering of information about the population, the teaching of trades, education, welfare provision, ideological indoctrination and, most importantly the construction of a market. These activities concern the practices of everyday life constitutive of human subjectivity and social order. They are the practices we associated with political power: the dispersal of the mythical entity called ‘security’ through civil society and the fabrication of order around the logic of peace and security. This is pacification through policing of the everyday insecurities of life organized around accumulation and money, which would, form this point on, remain central to the colonial enterprise.

The constant “revolutionizing of the instrument of production” endemic to capitalist development — technological development, the rise, crest and collapse of business cycles and capital movement — creates a permanent politics of insecurity. Insecurities, both the quotidian problems of daily existence and global structural problems, need to be “secured” to provide the necessary modicum of stability to allow for capital accumulation. Capitalism requires constant pacification.

Processes of pacification, however, are not only the purview of peripheralized states. It is a long term, large scale process that links seemingly disparate world regions. “The creation of strong states becomes impossible to understand, much less explain,” William Martin and Mark Beittel argue:

In this regard, “planter-dominated political systems in the Americas” and “bourgeois, industrial states in Europe,” were formed by different facets of larger world-historic processes. Accordingly, the “consolidation of states in core areas is matched to the collapse of states in peripheral areas.” Just as the colonial plunder of the world drove the industrialization of the West, the political experience in conquering and governing the world’s peripheries conditioned the development of “strong states” in the West. While the solidly democratic societies of the core of the world system can incorporate more of their populations on consensual grounds than the weak states of peripheralized societies, the histories of pacifying unruly populations and securing the insecurities of capitalist development join states across such wide gulfs of wealth and power in collective political projects to secure the insecurities of capitalist development.

More concretely, methods of rule first pioneered in peripheralized regions often become seemingly natural features of governance in the core of the world system. After all, one of the first modern police forces, the Metropolitan Police of London, founded in 1829, is based upon the earlier example of the Royal Irish Constabulary in 1818. Indeed, what is now called intelligence-led policing in “the core” is prefigured by the experience of colonial policing: the Special Branches and Criminal Investigative Divisions of British colonial police, the gendarmerie and police spéciale of French colonies and the Garde d’Haiti and Philippine Constabulary from the United States’ more limited experience in formal colonialism. From this historical perspective, counterinsurgency, as an integrated operation of all elements of state power that joins states across wide gulfs of wealth and power, becomes policy discourse and state practice that link the formation of strong states and the deformation of weak states.

The Formation of Strong States and the Deformation of Weak States

As one of the political processes creating and maintaining the uneven distributions of wealth and power that are the material determinants of differential outcomes of state-formation, counterinsurgency structurally joins the formation of strong states and the deformation of weak states. Institutionally, involvement in counterinsurgency bloats the secretive, non-parliamentary organs of state and institutes extra-legal space that has variously been called “the wild zone of power” or a “space of exception.” Building on Carl Schmidt’s observation that identification of the enemy is the act that creates a collective entity that undergirds sovereign state power, Susan Buck-Morss argues that “[m]odern sovereignties harbor a blind spot, a zone in which power is above the law and thus, at least potentially, a terrain of terror.” Similarly, Georgio Agamben has advanced the notion of “space of exception,” the area excluded from sovereign protection and populated by bearers of what he calls “bare life,” politically excluded and subject to unrestrained violence. In these terms, counterinsurgency both creates broad “spaces of exception” in peripheralized regions and institutes the “wild zone of power” even within the solidly democratic capitalist core.

The differential institution of “spaces of exception” is evident in the societies touched by the late nineteenth century rise of the United States as world power. During the Great Depression of the nineteenth century, the United States resolved the generalized crisis in overproduction through overseas imperialism. This was the period of Open Door Policy in the Pacific and the Banana Wars in the Caribbean. In addition to opening China to trade, this self-consciously imperialist foreign policy asserted US power over its Latin American periphery, positioning the rest of the Western Hemisphere as an investment opportunity of US capital and a market for US goods. Through a series of conflicts formative to the nascent policy discourse of counterinsurgency — Boxer Rebellion in China (1898), the Philippine Insurrection and Moro Rebellion (1898-1913), occupations of Cuba (1898-1912), Dominican Republic (1903-1924), Honduras (1903-25) and Haiti (1915-34) — the contours of the US national security began to take shape in the same process that created comprador regimes on the periphery of the US imperium.

Haiti, the Philippines and the United States

The Philippine Insurrection, Moro Rebellion and US occupation of Haiti, for example, conditioned the dynamics of state formation in the US, Haiti and the Philippines. While the scope of fighting was comparatively small in comparison to conventional wars, the fighting was nonetheless brutal. United States occupation authorities mobilized gangs of corvée laborers to develop economic infrastructure necessary to better integrate Haiti into the world market — roads, telegraph lines, hospitals. The occupation and particularly, the re-imposition of slavery through corvée labor sparked a peasant insurrection, the Cacos Rebellion, which climaxed with an insurrection provisional government and at least 2,000 men under arms in Northern Haiti. By the time the rebellion was crushed in 1919, approximately 11,500 Haitians had died with 6,000 killed in fighting and another 5,500 perished from forced labor.

In addition to disciplining the Haitian population and reaffirming the region’s position as one of the most peripheralized zones of the world system, another enduring consequence of the occupation was the militarization of the Haitian state. Occupation authorities formed the Haitian gendarmerie or Garde D’Haïti, a military force with the dual mission of law enforcement and territorial defense that initially was under the command of a US Marine or Navy officer. During the occupation, the gendarmerie fought the cacos, and oversaw forced labor crews. As the only armed force and one that blended police and military functions, the Garde D’Haïti was uniquely politicized in a way that reflected its formation in the crucible of counterinsurgency. Reflecting this undemocratic legacy, Robert Fatton Jr. — in his analysis of Haiti’s predatory state as a malformed state rooted in the legacies of colonialism, US occupation and contradictions of dependent development — calls the Haitian army “the Trojan horse of the old predatory coalition.” After years of meddling in politics, including several military coups, the Aristide administration, the first democratically

counterinsurgency quelled the nationalist insurgency by 1902 and the revolt of tremendous amounts of violence in order to suppress nationalist revolt. While Philippines, then, US occupation first created a broad space of exception and used toral participation, from nationalist idealism to material realism.”

elected leadership in Haitian history, disbanded the army in 1994. The legacy of counterinsurgency in Haiti was a militarized and deformed state with the capacities to open up broad spaces of exception and dole out tremendous violence against its own people.

Similar dynamics are evident in the example of the Philippines. In contrast to the much smaller Cacos Rebellion, the combined human cost of the Philippine Insurrection and Moro Rebellion reached that of conventional wars: between 100,000 and 600,000 Filipinos died.66

The occupation had three discernible stages:

[... first, a short bloody war against the Philippine Army; next, a harsh counterinsurgency to crush its guerilla forces; and finally, a protracted secret-police operation to demoralize the radical leaders and discredit the nationalist ideals that had been their inspiration.

Institutionally, the result of the pacification of the Philippines was, like Haiti, a deformed, militarized state. By 1903, the occupation already created 10,400 police positions to complement the 18,000 American soldiers and 22,000 Filipino troops. The police did the intimate work of governing. By the time of nominal independence in 1935, the Manila Metropolitan police had amassed files on 200,000 Filipinos or 70 percent of the city, and the Philippine Constabulary, now a 6,000-man-strong paramilitary force, had pacified the country and built a nationwide intelligence network that included Manuel Quezon, the future Philippine president, as an informant and collaborator.37

All told, the occupation developed robust intelligence-gathering, covert action and police capacities that “redirected the country’s political trajectory from confrontation to collaboration, from revolutionary mobilization to electoral participation, from nationalist idealism to material realism.”38 In the Philippines, then, US occupation first created a broad space of exception and used tremendous amounts of violence in order to suppress nationalist revolt. While counterinsurgency quelled the nationalist insurgency by 1902 and the revolt of Southern Moro people by 1918, the persistent police operations that followed fabricated a social order of polyarchic democracy.39 The overdeveloped police capacities of the Philippine state, like that of Haiti, became an enduring force in the country’s political history. An instrument of political warfare deployed against communist guerillas in late 1950, the police became the institutionalization of states’ wild zone of power. Under the Marcos regime, where security forces killed 3,257, tortured an estimated 35,000 and “salvaged” or dismembered and displayed 2,520, “the police grew increasingly brutal, making torture and salvaging standard procedures against both political dissidents and petty criminals.”40

Involvement in counterinsurgency also transformed the institutional composition of the United States. Here, Alfred McCoy’s comment on the political effects of colonial interventions on metropolitan countries is apt: “Just as war transforms technology and industry, so colonialism plays a comparable role for government, producing innovations, particularly in the use of coercive controls, with a profound impact on its bureaucracies both home and abroad.” In his work, for example, McCoy demonstrates how the Philippines became an important colonial laboratory, unrestrained by democratic process, to systemize a permanent counterinsurgency state, which “succeeded in containing and then crippling the radical left, advancing collaborating elites and shifting the center of political gravity from militant nationalism to patronage politics.”41

These tactics were repatriated back to the Progressive-era United States, where they enabled a dramatic leap in the state’s capacity for internal pacification. Here, Ralph Van Deman, “the father of military intelligence,” is the personification of the world-relational linkages among state (de)formation processes in the US and the Philippines. During the occupation of the Philippines, Van Deman commanded the Division of Military Information, running information networks and synthesizing intelligence from across the archipelago. Upon his return to the US, Secretary of War Newton Baker placed Van Deman in the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID) in 1915. In the coming years, Van Deman, the MID, its informant networks and its meticulous files were at the base of some of the worst episodes of domestic policing in the United States: the

37 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 26, 28, 62-63, 234-235.
38 Ibid., 124.
40 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 403.
41 Ibid., 21-27, 37, 129
Palmer Raids, Hollywood Blacklisting anti-Japanese hysteria and, when Van Deman’s files were transferred to the FBI upon his death in 1952, the COINTELPRO program.\textsuperscript{42} Although less explicit and more shrouded by the more strongly institutionalized democratic institutions of core states, US involvement within the wild zones of power, in specific moments, opened spaces of exception where even US citizens became legitimate targets of violence.

\textbf{Politicization of Security Professionals}

Practically, counterinsurgency politicizes security professionals in ways that undermine the rule of law and democratic process. In the crucible of counterinsurgency, they learn to place an “emphasis on the unity and interrelatedness of civilian and military tasks and authority” and eventually carry their “determination to equip the natives with the ‘will to fight’ [...] to the metropolitan country when the ‘will’ of the people ‘at home’ appears to be sagging. The crusade abroad may find expressions at home when the society is viewed as needing moral or political regeneration.”\textsuperscript{43}

In the United States, aforementioned Ralph Van Deman is the perfect example. Ostensibly focusing on counterintelligence, the Military Intelligence Division’s “‘suspect list’ for domestic subsversives [...] consisted of many hundreds of thousands [...]” In Van Deman’s view, Irish Americans, German Americans, ‘Hindus’ and ‘Negros’ were all dangerously susceptible to enemy propaganda and required constant surveillance.” Van Deman’s fears of political subversion animated MID’s “wartime mission that suffered from a [...] combination of class bias and ethnic anxiety” and opened a space of exception that enveloped both Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) activists and African Americans. Although never able to produce any evidence, the MID consistently concluded that “Negro subversion” instigated by German provocateurs was a grave threat to security. Colonial rule and counterinsurgency, then, “had a profound influence on metropolitan society, introducing an imperial mentality of coercive governance into US domestic politics.”\textsuperscript{44}

In France, the introduction of counterinsurgent mentality produced even more dramatic and explosive results. As early as the 1920s, Field Marshall Lyautey “emphasiz[ed] that the army might be required to move beyond colonial administration to regenerate French society and politics [...] in the interests of maintaining the empire.”\textsuperscript{45} In the lead up to World War II, Lyautey’s attitude became emblematic of far right politics in France. Late in his life, Lyautey joined the Croix-de-Feu, a fascist organization and after massive right wing demonstrations turned violent in February 1934, Lyautey threatened to lead Jeunesses Patriotes, a fascist paramilitary group, on a march on the Chamber of Deputies, a threat so ominous that it lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Édouard Daladier.\textsuperscript{46} While Lyautey died soon thereafter, prominent counterinsurgents continued to be involved in far right politics. In the 1940s, Charles Lacheroy and Roger Trinquier, two notable counterinsurgents, joined La Cité Catholique, a far-right anti-communist Catholic organization whose members (including Lacheroy) overlapped with the Organisation de l’armée secrète, a right wing terrorist organization dedicated to preserving French rule over Algeria.\textsuperscript{47} For France, counterinsurgency “produced, at first, deep extra-constitutional involvement by the military in the political affairs of the country and finally a rebellion.”\textsuperscript{48}

Like in the French case, counterinsurgency politicized security professionals in the Philippines. The permanent counterinsurgency state created by US occupation and intensified during the Marcos dictatorship produced a hardened cadre of mid-ranking military officers that were frustrated by the ceilings to their career advancement set by the internal politics of the Marcos-era military and emboldened to turn their experience in political warfare against the regime: “these young lieutenants learned [...] to regard their own society as the enemy and used espionage, surveillance, arrest and torture against people who, in normal circumstances, they would have been defending from foreign attack.” Calling themselves the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), these rebellious officers first attempted a coup against Marcos in 1986 and launched five more failed coups against Marcos’ democratic suc-

\bibitem{Ahmad2006} Eqbal Ahmad, “Counterinsurgency,” 64.
cessor Corazon Aquino. Following the collapse of their final coup attempt in 1989, RAM went underground and continued a bombing campaign.49

The politicization and revolt of the Filipino army officers directly was resolved in terms consistent with the historic deformation of the Filipino state. With conflicting pressures from RAM to restore a military dictatorship under new leadership and the Aquino government to recognize civilian rule, the Armed Forces of the Philippines eventually settled into post-Marcos accommodation with elite democracy:

[...] the military recognized ‘civilian supremacy’ and accommodated itself to the existence of elite democracy on the condition that Aquino give it free rein in conducting the counterinsurgency and, effectively, agree to treat it like a state within a state with veto power over vital areas of national policy.50

Here, through the politicization of security professionals, counterinsurgency acts as a force that feeds the wild zone of power at the basis of modern sovereignty.

Counterinsurgency and Shifting Patterns of World Order

The institutional and practical processes captured by the policy discourse and practice of counterinsurgency — the differential institution of the wild zone of power in peripheral and core sovereignties and the subsequent politicization of security professionals — are visible within a few discreet moments in the world system and are some of the political processes that inform the constitution, decomposition and reconstitution of world order. Historically, counterinsurgency, a policy discourse that emerged out of the cumulative experiences of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century’s imperial expansion, was a political practice and discourse that animated the incorporation of new areas of the globe into the world-system.

Emerging out of fin de siècle imperialism, counterinsurgency linked the consolidation of colonial rule and the formation of the increasingly autarkic states and national economies in the lead up to World War II. As the nineteenth-century order of “free trade imperialism” broke down during the long depression of 1873-96, the great powers scrambled for Africa, dismembered Qing China, and deepened control in preexisting colonial peripheries in order to support the increasingly interventionist states of the period “rival imperialisms.” In contrast to the earlier liberal period, states were now defined in sharper opposition to other societies and fortified with limited concessions to once disenfranchised groups and classes.51 During this time, moreover, nascent counterinsurgency enabled the consolidation of the colonial relations that provided the base for industrialization, urbanization and the massive growth in the institutional capacity of the state.

These global structures and social relations secured by nascent counterinsurgency conditioned massive social and cultural change. For the United States, the fin de siècle imperialism and nascent counterinsurgency provided the context in which an increasingly assertive national identity could be formed while simultaneously drawing the racial and gender boundaries of an unruly world in the want of paternal leadership. The US occupation of Haiti, Mary Renda asserts, “contributed to both the bolstering and the reshaping of prevailing conceptions of national identity [...] prop[elling] the cultural logic of ‘American greatness.’” However, the occupation “could never control the entire discursive terrain” and “other discourses crowded the field.” Citing Eugene O’Neill’s The Emperor Jones and Zora Neale Hurston’s Tell my Horse, Renda sees Haiti as a site of “struggle over the politics of masculinity and other implications of interventionist paternalism’s gender politics.” Even these seemingly progressive engagements with Haiti, however, “were bound up with cultural fabric of paternalism and exoticism, whether they thought they were shredding that fabric or donning it with pride.”52 In less explicit fashion, the social relations secured by nascent counterinsurgency enabled the “housewifization” of middle and working class households. “Housewifization” is the process where the capital accumulated through and new household products derived from colonial expansion enabled the positioning of women in strong states as consumers, while simultaneously relegating them to the domestic sphere and the “cult

49 Alfred McCoy, The Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 77-86.
of domesticity.53

After World War II, the disparate writings of an older generation of officers — like French Field Marshalls Joseph Gallieni and Louis Hubert Gonzalez Lyautey, who pioneered counterinsurgency in Indochina and Morocco, respectively, and Madagascar, collectively; British Major General Charles Callwell, who served in the Second Boer War, and Army Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence (“of Arabia”); and the various US officers who served the occupation of the Phillipines and the “Banana Wars” in Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic — were objectized in text and military doctrine and variously instituted in state structures throughout the world.54 Counterinsurgency had become a common, if minor, element in the security apparatuses of the core of empowered states that constitute the center of the world system.

As the independence struggles escalated during the twentieth century, counterinsurgency became a way to maintain formal colonial relations in a period of crisis, war and eventually, decolonization. While imperial expansion depended on illiberal discourses like the British “white man’s burden,” the French mission civilisatrice and the American manifest destiny, counterinsurgency is actually consonant with progressive and liberal values. “The rhetoric which defines its goals is reformist and liberal,” Eqbal Ahmad explains:

Freedom, progress, development, democracy, reforms, participation, and self-determination are its favorite working words. Generally, their theorists, of whom a majority comes from France and the USA, have been men of impeccable liberal credentials […] [A]mong its most prominent exponents, Ahmad counts “many of Kennedy’s New Frontiersmen and well-known university professors” and “in France, […] such eminent politicians as Jacques Sourelle [an anthropologist and the French Minister of State in charge of Overseas Departments] and Robert Lacoste,” a socialist MP and senator.55

In this way, counterinsurgency became extremely important to the consolidation of the US-led Cold War order. The Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China’s claim to the revolutionary mantel left the United States with an ideological gap to cover if it did not want to openly embrace the counterrevolution. Counterinsurgency, in redefining revolution as insurgency, constituted an a priori denial of legitimacy to revolutionary movements. Along with modernization theory and the discourse on totalitarianism, which conjoined interwar fascism and state socialism, counterinsurgency made the US-subsidized counterrevolution against state socialism — “the Cold War” — possible by displacing counterrevolution as an object of study and developing an ideological project to frame it in progressive, albeit non-revolutionary, terms.56 Indeed, the late 1950s and 1960s were the golden era of counterinsurgency as the West broadly embraced the policy to manage political struggles like the Greek Civil War, Malayan Insurrection, Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, Indochina Wars and Algerian War of Independence. On this point, the highly touted East Asian development state must be seen as the consensual carrot of development offered to Taiwan and South Korea and politically powerful contrast to the coercive stick of counterinsurgency offered to Indochina.57

These struggles — particularly the Algerian War of Independence for France and the Second Indochina War for the United States — helped break US-centered postwar order: Socially, the conflicts occupied world attention and animated radical revolt across the world; economically, war spending drove stagflation; politically, Algerian and Vietnamese victory marked the declining utility of direct military force to manage the restive peripheries of the world. In this context, the profile of counterinsurgency was lowered and the strategy was rehabilitated as “low-intensity warfare.” Instead of direct intervention of foreign troops, Western powers sent only advisors and relied on foreign surrogates. Here, the US support of South African intervention in Angola, the CIA

54 Its formative texts were: from the UK, Charles Callwell’s Small Wars Journal (1896) and T.E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1922) on the English backed “Arab Revolt” against the Ottoman Empire from 1916 to 1918; from France, Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare (1964) and David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare (1964), both drawing on World War II, The First Indochina War and The Algerian War; and from the US, the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual (1940), drawing on US occupations of the Phillipines, Haiti, and Nicaragua. With the renewed interest in counterinsurgency these texts have been recently republished: Charles Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Seasides: Watchmaker Publishing, 2010); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Blackshurg: Wilder Publications); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2009).

and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence’s funding and training of the Afghan Mujahedeen during the Soviet War in Afghanistan and US support for Central American death squads, the Nicaraguan Contras being the most prominent, are emblematic of reformed counterinsurgency. In all these cases, counterinsurgency was used for decidedly counterrevolutionary purposes to support undemocratic movements or states loyal to the West that were fighting the expansion of state socialism or a mass based revolutionary movement.

In the last decade, the prominent return of counterinsurgency speaks to an era of heightened global conflict and the increasing militarization of the processes of state (de)formation. In a context of economic crisis, ecological disaster and resource competition, the application of counterinsurgency in the West’s War on Terror must be seen as an attempt to maintain the colonial relations of power upon which modern capitalist world system rests. This resurgent counterinsurgency links the militarization of the state across the divides of wealth and power. In Iraq, the United States’ occupation has succeeded in creating a militarized counterinsurgency state. While the rest of the Arab world exploded in democratic rebellion, Iraq quietly detained hundreds including prominent journalists, artists and intellectuals in response to protests in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square calling for anti-corruption measures and improved state services.

On the other end of this colonial relationship, in the United States, the tactics of counterinsurgency are being repatriated to militarize the law enforcement. Under the guise of counterterrorism, there has been a rapid proliferation of “intelligence-led policing” which strongly resembles the practice of counterinsurgency with its aggressive and preemptive surveillance of suspect individuals and communities. Here, the fusion centers overseen by my former Congressmen and CIA Vietnam veteran, Robert Simmons are the heart of the contemporary militarization of policing. Fusion centers are just one small component in rapid expansion of the security apparatus. Currently, “1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States.” Many of these new agencies and centers, moreover, are at the center of recent controversies involving the illegal repression and harassment of the constitutionally protected in political activity.

Conclusion

Altogether, counterinsurgency, as a world-relational political process, presents many challenges to traditional social science with its focus on individual nations as the unit of analysis. As an organized and institutionalized form of practice, counterinsurgency emerged as a pseudo-scientific policy discourse variously practiced, codified and instituted by the great imperial powers. As a historical process, counterinsurgency transforms both the state in which it is applied and the state which is imposing or sponsoring, differentially instituting a wild zone of power within both the corrupt dictatorships and faltering polyarchic democracies of periphery and solidly democratic states of the capitalist core. Taking a wider view, counterinsurgency links states across the unevenly developed interstate system and world-economy together in an interactive system, which, simultaneously, creates and constitutes the colonial differences dividing global society. As it concerns the state, counterinsurgency becomes one of the processes linking the formation of strong states and the deformation of weak states. It secures the global inequalities necessary for the accumulation of capital and helps creating the institutional arrangements necessary to maintain unstable co-

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ercive political systems in the world’s peripheries. It is on this basis, that the current resurgence of counterinsurgency must be approached, understood and engaged. PEAR

CAPABILITY APPROACH TO STREET VENDORS IN VIETNAM
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Street vending is not a new phenomenon, but one that is generally considered part of an underdeveloped and backward society primarily dominated by the informal sector, which will disappear once a country modernizes. In developing countries such as Vietnam, however, efforts to deter the activity have only been met with a street vending population growing faster than ever and contributing to urban livelihood. In this paper, I will use the Capabilities Approach advocated by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, David Crocker and others to justify policies to accommodate street vendors. I will also draw on the experience of other countries to propose a set of strategies to organize street vending in Vietnam.

Introduction

A phenomenon common in many developing countries, including Vietnam, are the parallel existences of the formal economy and its informal counterpart. Street vending makes up a large portion of the informal economy, and is defined as any activity that produces or distributes legal and socially acceptable goods from the street, informal market or other publicly accessible space, while avoiding regulatory control. Street vending has long been an integral part of Vietnamese economy, society and culture, despite its drawbacks. However, it has traditionally been marginalized and vendors are constantly subject to police harassment. Despite frequent attacks and persistent problems, street vending continues to exist and even thrive, possibly as a result of government policies, economic development and subsequent inequalities. The irony of street vent-

1 John Cross and Alfonso Morales, Street Entrepreneurs: People, Place and Politics in Local and Global Perspective (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
3 Cross and Morales, Street Entrepreneurs.